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Abstract
Taking into account the results that we have been obtained during the last
decade in the foundations of quantum mechanic we put forward a view on
reality that we call the ‘creation discovery view’. In this view it is made
explicit that a measurement is an act of a macroscopic physical entity on
a microphysical entity that entails the creation of new elements of reality
as well as the detection of existing elements of reality. Within this view
most of the quantum mechanical paradoxes are due to structural short-
comings of the standard quantum theory, which means that our analysis
agrees with the claim made in the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paper, namely
that standards quantum mechanics is an incomplete theory. This incom-
pleteness is however not due to the absence of hidden variables but to
the impossibility for standard quantum mechanics to describe separated
quantum entities. Nonlocality appears as a genuine property of nature in
our view and makes it necessary to reconsider the role of space in real-
ity. Our proposal for a new interpretation for space makes it possible to
put forward an new hypothesis for why it has not been possible to unify
quantum mechanics and relativity theory.
Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything ex-
ternal, remains always similar and immovable. Absolute, true, and
mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equally
without relation to anything external.
Isaac Newton, 1642 - 1726.
∗Published as: Aerts, D., 1999, “The stuff the world is made of: physics and reality”, in
Einstein meets Magritte: an interdisciplinary reflection, eds. Aerts, D., Broekaert, J. and
Mathijs, E., Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht.
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An intelligence that would know at a certain moment all the forces
existing in nature and the situations of the bodies that compose na-
ture, and if it would be powerful enough to analyze all these data,
would be able to grasp in one formula the movements of the biggest
bodies of the Universe as well as of the lightest atom.
Simon Laplace, 1749 - 1827
Because of the relativity of the concept of simultaneity, space and
time melt together to a four dimensional continuum.
Albert Einstein, 1897 - 1955
Everything is still unclear to me, but my feeling is getting stronger
everyday. I believe that in the scheme that I am developing the parti-
cles will not move anymore on orbits, and we shall have to reconsider
fundamental classical concepts.
Werner Heisenberg, 1901 - 1976
The word Physics comes from the Greek word ‘phusis’, which means ‘that what
comes into existence’, and itself is derived from the Greek verb ‘phuoo’ which
means ‘to create, to come into existence’.
In this paper we want to investigate what we can say about reality taking
into account the latest insights from physics. We shall see that our intuitive
conception of reality is challenged by the two fundamental physical theories of
modern times, quantum mechanics and relativity theory. Instead of starting
here with subtle philosophical considerations - we shall have ample place for
that later - we want to confront the reader immediately with one of the more
mysterious aspects of quantum reality, namely, non-locality.
1 Magic with neutrons.
In this section we present an experiment on single quantum entities that illus-
trates, in our opinion, the problem of non-locality as encountered in quantum
mechanics in its most crucial form. It is an experiment in neutron interferome-
try performed by Helmut Rauch and his collaborators. The preparation of the
experiment was published in [1], while the actual experiment, as presented here,
was performed a year later and the results were published in [2]. Rauch has also
written a ‘review article’ on the numerous neutron experiments that have since
been performed [3].
Helmut Rauch and his group had built their first neutron interferometer in
1976. To do this, starting from a perfect monocrystalline silicium block, they
had cut out a crystal in the shape shown in Figure 1, with three parallel walls
or lips of precisely the same thickness. In their experiments, they directed a
neutron beam onto one side of the crystal lips, and detected it on the other side.
According to quantum mechanics the beam should behave in a rather mysterious
manner, and Rauch and his group wanted to verify if the predicted behavior was
correct. The beam was directed onto the crystal from the “northwest” direction
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(see Figure 2). On the first lip, the incident beam splits into two beams, which
we shall call the northern and the southern beams; these then travel on towards
the second lip.
Fig. 1: The perfect silicium crystal, as used by Helmut Rauch’s group at the Laue-
Langevin Institute in Grenoble.
The northern beam undergoes refraction at the first lip, and travels on a north-
east course, while the southern beam continues in the prolongation of the in-
cident beam. On the second lip, the two beams again split, and of the four
resultant beams, two will converge from north and south to cross on the third
lip.
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Fig. 2: Two representations of the Rauch experiment. The incident beam comes in
from northwest, and is split on the first lip into two beams: one is refracted to the
northeast (the northern beam), and the other (the southern beam) continues in the
southeasterly direction. On the second lip there is a further splitting giving rise to
four beams, of which two, the northern and the southern beam, cross on the third
lip, and upon emerging from the crystal, are detected, and the neutrons counted.
Two detectors placed on their paths make it possible to count the neutrons as
they emerge from the crystal. Rauch’s crystal is 7 cm long and 8 cm wide, so
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that the top view of Figure 2 is half of the real size. The neutrons are emitted
one at the time from a reactor at an average speed of 2200 meters per second,
which is approximately 5000 miles per hour, and on average they are separated
by a distance of 300 meters. This means that there will never be more than one
single neutron within the crystal. In point of fact, when a given neutron passes
through the crystal lips, the neutron that will follow has not yet been produced
in the reactor.
In Rauch’s experiments each of the neutrons has a “coherence length” of one
millionth of a centimeter. This means that the region within which the neutrons
exercises an action, or inversely, within which it can be acted upon, is restricted
to a cube of side one millionth of a centimeter. This is a very small volume
indeed, and one of the problems that we are confronted with is that we lose all
intuitive feeling on such small scales. To understand fully just how strange the
results of Rauch’s experiments are, let me scale the volume up to a size where
we can better visualize it. Let us therefore reconsider the Rauch experiments
on a scale 25 million times larger.
To do this, first take the real crystal and place it on a map of Europe scaled
down twenty five million times. Then scale back up to get an imaginary super
crystal covering a large area of Central Europe (Figure 3). The neutrons will
now seem to be coming in from over the Atlantic Ocean, penetrating the super-
crystal in Paris. The first lip, in which the neutron beam is split, lies over
France and Great Britain. The northern beam flicks north-east over Belgium,
and penetrates the second lip somewhere between Denmark and Norway. The
southern beam passes over Bern, and attains the second lip in Trieste. In the
second lip, the beams are are again split in two, so that four beams emerge, of
which two in the direction of Warsaw where they cross. The northern beam has
passed over Copenhagen, and the southern over Vienna. Upon emerging from
the crystal, the neutrons fly on towards Saint Petersburg or the Crimea, where
they will be detected. We mentioned that in the real experiments the field of
influence of the neutrons can be considered as localized within a small cube of
side one millionth of a centimeter. This becomes a cube of 25 centimeters on
the scale for which the crystal covers half of Europe.
The passage of the neutron beam through the crystal lips will probably
have suggested the following picture in most readers’ minds: the neutrons as
small projectiles, and the beam as a machine-gun fire of these projectiles. Let
us think through a Rauch experiment assuming that the projectile analogy is
correct. The machine-gun which is firing the neutrons lies somewhere over the
Atlantic Ocean and is aiming at Paris. Remember that there is never more
that a single neutron within the crystal at any given moment. This means that
our machine-gun fires very slowly, one neutron after the other at large time
intervals. A given neutron will have been detected in Saint Petersburg or in
the Crimea long before the next neutron is fired. In our projectile analogy
we can thus consider individual trajectories for each neutron taken separately.
A given neutron comes in above the Channel, penetrates the crystal in Paris,
then either continues through towards Vienna on the southern beam line, or
is deflected towards Copenhagen on the northern beam. In the second lip, the
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same thing happens again: either the neutron passes through undeflected and
leaves the crystal, or it is deflected, and flicks over Vienna or Copenhagen in the
direction of Warsaw where it reaches the third lip. Yet again the neutron can
proceed undeflected, and it will finally reach the detectors in Saint Petersburg
or the Crimea.
St Petersburg
Paris
Copenhagen
Vienna
Crimea
Warsaw
Fig. 3: The super-crystal
projected on Europe.
If this machine-gun projectile analogy were correct, it would be difficult to imag-
ine anything mysterious about this experiment. But it is not correct. Further
on, we shall give a complete quantum mechanical description of what takes
place, so that we shall be able to see step by step how the mystery arises. At
present, let us just consider what actually happens in Rauch’s experiments,
because that is our direct concern at present.
The experimental set-up is such that Rauch is able to act upon each
neutron as it crosses lip 2 of the crystal, i.e. in our upscaled model,
within a 25 centimeter cube either in Copenhagen, or in Vienna.
More precisely, Rauch can rotate the neutron, using experimental
apparatus located in Copenhagen or Vienna, and which has only a
local effective range. The rotation of the neutron can be carried out
from either of the two experimental sites, Vienna or Copenhagen,
and will be observed by one of the detectors, in Saint Petersburg or
in the Crimea.
From this it is clear that the neutron does not behave like a small projectile, for
then it would pass either through Copenhagen, and Rauch could not rotate it
from Vienna, or it would pass through Vienna, so that he could not act on it from
Copenhagen. The experiment establishes that it is truly possible to rotate the
5
neutron both from Copenhagen and from Vienna, without anything happening
in the space between Vienna and Copenhagen. No signal which could influence
the neutron in any way is transmitted between Vienna and Copenhagen.
The apparatus which Rauch uses to rotate the neutron is a magnetic field
localized in a small region in Vienna and Copenhagen. There is no possibility
whatsoever that the magnetic field used in Copenhagen to rotate the neutron
could have any action outside Copenhagen, let alone in Vienna; at least if we
think of magnetic forces varying in space. And there is no possibility that the
neutron is partly in Copenhagen and partly in Vienna (whatever this would
mean), because, if we were to set up detectors there, what we would detect
in Vienna or in Copenhagen would always be either a complete neutron or no
neutron. More specifically there is one chance out of two for the whole neutron
to be detected in Copenhagen and one chance out of two for it to be detected
in Vienna. It is ‘as if’ the single neutron is present simultaneous in both places,
in the small cube in Vienna and in the small cube in Copenhagen, and that
it can be acted upon from both these places as though it really and truly be
there. An object which is simultaneous present in two distant places, can such
a thing possibly exist? Yet this is the result predicted by the theory of quantum
mechanics and obtained experimentally by Rauch. But quantum theory does
not tell us of how to understand this effect, and it is only recently that we are
beginning to understand more of it.
2 Non locality and the concept of space.
The Ptolomean system for our universe was not abandoned by reason of exper-
imental errors, for it fitted very well with all existing observations. To incorpo-
rate the descriptions of the known phenomena it only had to introduce additional
constructions, called epicycles, which gave rise to many complications but gave a
good fit to the experimental observations. But since the primary hypothesis (a)
the earth is the center of the universe and (b) all celestial bodies move in circles
around the earth were felt to be absolutely essential, the complications could be
interpreted as being due to specific properties of the planets. Copernicus (and
Greek scientists long before him) dropped hypothesis (a), substituting it by a
new one (c) the sun is the center of the universe. Clearly this new hypothesis
gave rise to a model that is much simpler than the original Ptolomaeus model.
Until the theoretical findings of Kepler, using the refined experimental results
of Brahe, hypothesis (b), the circle as the basic motion for the celestial objects,
remained unaltered, and Kepler was very unhappy when it became clear to him
that it was a wrong hypothesis. Now that we know the motion of the planets
around the sun as a general solution of Newton’s equations, the fact that these
motions proceed along ellipses does not bother us anymore. On the contrary,
the elliptic orbits have become a part of a much greater whole, Newtonian me-
chanics, which incorporate more beauty and symmetry than the original two
axioms that were of primary importance to Ptolomaeus.
The change from Ptolomaeus to Copernicus is typical in the evolution of
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scientific theories. Usually one is not conscious of the concepts that prevent
scientific theories from evolving in a fruitful direction. We claim that we have
now a similar situation for quantum mechanics, and that the concept of quantum
entity, and its meaning, is at the heart of it. We believe that the pre-scientific
preconception that has to be abandoned can be compared to that of the earth
being the center of the universe. It is a preconception that is due to the specific
nature of our human interaction with the rest of reality, and of the subjective
perspective following from this human interaction. We can only observe the
universe from the earth, and this gave us the perspective that the earth plays
a central role. In an analogous way we can only observe the micro-world from
our position in the macro-world; this forces us to extend the concepts of the
worldview constructed for this macro-world into the worldview that we try to
construct for the micro-world. That space-time is the global setting for reality
is such a hypothesis, and it leans only on our experience with the macroscopic
material world.
The experiment with the neutrons is only one of the many experiments that
have been carried out recently to exhibit the quantum effect that has been called
non-locality. We cannot go into all details in this paper and refer the reader to [1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6] for extensive analyses of Rauch’s experiment. Meanwhile, more than
two decades later, experimentators play in the laboratory with quantum entities
brought very explicitly in non-local states . And in 1997, Nicolas Gisin - with
whom the author of this article made his first steps in research as young students
at the university of Geneva - managed to produce a pair of non-local photons
over a distance of 20 kilometers, using glass fibers of Swiss Telecom between
two Swiss villages. All this shows that non- locality is a genuine property of
quantum entities.
It is our opinion that one cannot retain in quantum mechanics the hypothesis
that at every moment every entity is effectively present in space. The behaviour
of quantum entities, not only in Rauch’s experiment with neutrons but also in
many other experiments, shows us that this idea must be incorrect. Let us
therefore explicitly introduce the following hypothesis:
We shall assume that quantum entities are not permanently present
in space, and that, when a quantum entity is detected in such a non-
spatial state, it is ‘dragged’ or ‘sucked up’ into space by the detection
system
In our everyday reality, each material entity has at every instant its place in
space. In classical mechanics, there are various ways of specifying position in
3-dimensional space. For a solid body, one can give the position of its centre
of gravity, and its orientation in a coordinate system with origin in the centre
of gravity. For a liquid or a gas, one will use continuum mechanics and a
description in terms of fluid particles, filling that part of space where the mass
density of the liquid or the gas is different from zero. Waves too, although often
spread out, can be given a place in space. In classical mechanics, whatever the
description used and whichever entity is considered, it is in a well defined place.
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In the picture that we now want to propose for quantum entities the situation
is very different. We assume that the experiment in which the quantum entity
is detected contains a creation-element: this actually in part creates a place for
the entity, at the moment when the detection is carried out. More explicitly
this means that, before the experiment, the quantum entity did not necessarily
have a place in space and that its place is created by the experiment itself. An
analogous process happens when the momentum (product of velocity times mass
and intuitively thought of as the impact that an entity has on another entity
when colliding) of the quantum entity is measured. The quantum entity will
not in general have a momentum before the experiment carried out to measure
it. As often happens, everyday language helps us to understand this change in
meaning of the concept of space. One often considers reality as the setting in
which everything takes place. Events, when we do not yet consider them as
entities, still ‘take place’, which can be considered to imply that they are not
necessarily in space to start with.
At first sight it might seem that such a picture cannot satisfy those scientists
who seek the intuitive support of their imagination; but we shall see that this
impression is erroneous, and that it comes from preconceived ideas over what
‘being’ really is.
This brings us thus to the central question: the nature of ‘being’, or in other
words, the nature of reality.
It is perhaps now the moment to say that the results that we present in
this article have been acquired over a period of two decades. In a first period,
mostly by myself, but certainly inspired by my experience as doctorate student
in the school of Constantin Piron in Geneva. And later, together with my young
collaborators in our research group FUND at the university of Brussels. The
totality of our results together form a specific view, an interpretation of quantum
mechanics, that we have called the creation-discovery view. We refer to [4, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12] and first give here a short description of this creation-discovery
view.
Within the creation-discovery view it is taken for granted that during an
act of measurement there always exist two aspects, a discovery of a part of
reality that was present independently of the act of measurement, and a creation
that adds new elements of reality to the process of measurement and to the
entity under investigation. When we put forward the creation- discovery view
in this way, it does not seem to contradict our intuition. Indeed creating part of
reality during the act of measurement is certainly not contra- intuitive. We are
confronted with so many situations in our daily life where such creation aspects
are obviously present. To make clear what we mean let me give a very common
example from our everyday life. Suppose that an interviewer is questioning a
person for an opinion poll. It is obvious that the act of interviewing itself, the
way the question is asked, the attitude of the interviewer, in short, each aspect
of the context in which the interview takes place, can in part create the answer
of the person interviewed, depending on the type of question that is asked. In
this example of the interview for an opinion poll, the creative aspect is well
known and not mysterious at all. The creation- discovery view as applied to the
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interpretation of quantum mechanics has however far reaching consequences
that do contradict certain aspects of our intuition. More precisely, and we come
back now to the situation of Rauch’s experiment, it is the hypothesis that the
whole of reality can be contained within space that turns out to be at stake.
Indeed, we can show that within ‘the creation-discovery view’ as applied to the
micro-world, the creation aspect of a quantum measurement in the detection
of a quantum entity contains in part the creation of the place of the quantum
entity itself. This means that the place of this quantum entity did not exist
before the entity was detected, and this place is created during the process of
detection. The same is true for the property ‘momentum’ of a quantum entity.
It is partly created during the process of the measurement of this property, and
did not exist before. As a consequence, a quantum entity in most of its states
does not have a place - in technical jargon, we say that it is not localized - and
it does not have a momentum (or impact which is a property more easy to
imagine for us). We want to state clearly that the reason we have developed
this creation-discovery view is not because we just wanted to try it out for
philosophical purposes. The reason is that we were compelled to formulate it,
on the one hand, due to the new and very subtle experiments on single quantum
entities like the one of Helmut Rauch, and on the other hand, as a result of new
theoretical investigations, the details of which are however too technical to be
presented here.
Let us now analyse in which way we apply the creation-discovery view to
describe the experiments like the one of Helmut Rauch. Within the creation-
discovery view, we propose that the mysterious aspects of the Rauch experiments
result from the fact that the neutron involved is ‘not present in space’. And
that the two experimental cubes, the one in Copenhagen and the one in Vienna,
can be considered as windows through which we can act on the neutron in its
non-spatial state. The two cubes are openings which give us access to the reality
‘out of space’.
We no longer visualize space as an all-embracing setting in which the whole
play of reality takes place, but as a structure that we, as human beings, have
constructed, relying upon our everyday experience of the macroscopic entities
around us. We make a distinction between the following two properties: 1)
Every entity can be detected in space, and space is then one of the structures
in which we, as human beings, come into contact with and create a reality. 2)
Every entity is present in space, and space is then the setting in which all of
reality develops. While the first property also applies to quantum entities, the
second does not.
Our creation-discovery view introduces a new quality of reality for space.
Space as an intermediate structure in which encounters occur, rather than as
an all embracing setting. Things make their place instead of having a place.
Yet again, language is clearer in terms of events than of entities: think of the
expression: ‘participate’ in the making of an event. In our creation-discovery
view we participate in the making of an entity. We actually suspect that it is the
failure of space as a global setting for reality which accounts for the unsuccessful
outcome up till now of every attempt to unify relativity theory, for which space
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is a fundamental ingredient, with quantum mechanics. We shall turn to this
question in a later section of this paper.
3 The epicycles of De Broglie and Bohm, waves
and particles.
The pictures that have been put forward in a last but hard struggle to fit
quantum entities within the space-time setting make use of two basic prototypes:
particles and waves. The particle is identified by the fact that upon detection it
leaves a spot on the detection screen, while waves are to be recognized by their
characteristic interference patterns. Certain experiments with quantum entities
give results which are characteristic for particles, other experiments reveal the
presence of waves. This is the reason why the concepts of particles and waves
are used to attempt to represent quantum entities.
(1) De Broglie and Bohm: particles and waves.
There exists a representation using waves and particles together, introduced by
Louis de Broglie [13] in the early years of quantum mechanics, and which af-
ter a long period of neglect, was rediscovered by David Bohm and Jean Pierre
Vigier [14] and which is still now the object of active study in different research
centers. In this representation, it is assumed that a quantum entity is at the
same time always both a particle and a wave. The particle has the properties
of a small projectile, but is accompanied by a wave which is responsible for the
interference patterns. This representation of de Broglie and Bohm incorporates
the observed quantum phenomena and attempts to change as little as possible
at the level of the underlying reality where these quantum entities exist and
interact. This reality is the ordinary three-dimensional Euclidean space; the
quantum entity is considered to be both a wave and a particle, existing, mov-
ing and changing in this space. The specific quantum effects are accounted for
by a quantum potential which is effective in this three dimensional Euclidean
space, and which brings about the quantum non-local effects. The quantum
potential is the entity that carries most of the strange quantum behavior. The
quantum probabilities appear in the de Broglie-Bohm picture as ordinary clas-
sical probabilities, resulting from a lack of knowledge about the position of the
point particle associated with the quantum entity. This is exactly as for the
probabilities in a classical statistical theory, and is due to a lack of knowledge
about the micro-states of the atoms and molecules of the substance considered.
The de Broglie-Bohm picture is thus a hidden variable theory. The variables
describing the state of the point particle are the hidden variables, and the lack
of knowledge about these hidden variables is at the origin of the probabilistic
description.
There is however a serious problem with the de Broglie-Bohm theory when
one attempts to describe more than one quantum entity. Indeed, for the ex-
ample of two quantum entities, the wave corresponding to the composite entity
consisting of the two quantum entities is a wave in a six dimensional configura-
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tion space, and not in the three-dimensional Euclidean space, and the quantum
potential acts in this six-dimensional configuration space and not in the three-
dimensional Euclidean space. Moreover, when the composite entity is in a so
called ‘non-product state’, this wave in the six-dimensional configuration space
cannot be written as the product of two waves in the three-dimensional space
(hence the reason for naming these states “non-product states”). It is these
non-product states that give rise to the typical quantum mechanical Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen-like correlations between the two sub-entities. The existence of
these correlations has meanwhile been experimentally verified by different ex-
periments, so that the reality of the non-product states, and consequently the
impossibility to define the de Broglie-Bohm theory in three-dimensional space,
is firmly established. This important conceptual failure of the de Broglie-Bohm
theory is certainly also one of the main reasons that Bohm himself considered
the theory as being a preliminary version of yet another theory to come [15].
(2) Bohr: the Copenhagen interpretation.
The usual representation of quantum entities makes use either of a wave or of a
particle, and although it is now associated with the Copenhagen school, it was
present in quantum mechanics from the very start. In this picture it is considered
that the quantum entity can behave in two ways, either like a particle or like a
wave, and that the choice between the two types of behavior is determined by
the nature of the observation being made. If the measurement one is making
consists in detecting the quantum entity, then it will behave like a particle and
leave a spot on the detection screen, just as a small projectile would. But if one
chooses an interferometric experiment, then the quantum entity will behave like
a wave, and give rise to the typical interference pattern characteristic for waves.
When referring to this picture one usually speaks of Bohr’s complementarity
principle, thereby stressing the dual structure assumed for the quantum entity.
This aspect of the Copenhagen interpretation has profound consequences for the
general nature of reality. The complementarity principle introduces the necessity
of a far reaching subjective interpretation for quantum theory. If the nature of
the behavior of a quantum entity (wave or particle) depends on the choice of the
experiment that one decides to perform, then the nature of reality as a whole
depends explicitly on the act of observation of this reality. As a consequence
it makes no sense to speak about a reality which exists independently of the
observer.
This dramatic aspect of the Copenhagen interpretation is best illustrated
by the delayed-choice experiments proposed by John Archibald Wheeler, where
the experimental choice made at one moment can modify the past. Wheeler’s
reasoning is based on an experimental apparatus as shown in Figure 4, where
a source emits extremely low intensity photons, one at a time, with a long
time interval between one photon and the next. The light beam is incident on
a semitransparant mirror A and divides into two beams, a northern beam n,
which is again reflected by the totally reflecting mirror N and sent towards the
photomultiplier D1, and a southern beam s, which is reflected by the totally
reflecting mirror S, and sent towards the photomultiplier D2. We know that
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the outcome of the experiment will be that every photon will be detected either
by D1 or by D2.
A
n
N
D1
D2
s
S
Fig. 4 : The delayed-choice experimental setup as proposed by John Archibald
Wheeler. A source emits extremely low intensity photons that are incident on a
semitransparant mirror A. The beam divides into two, a northern beam n, which is
again reflected by the totally reflecting mirror N and sent towards the photomultiplier
D1, and a southern beam s, which is reflected by the totally reflecting mirror S, and
sent towards the photomultiplier D2.
Following the Copenhagen complementarity interpretation, this experimental
situation forces a photon to behave like a particle, that will be detected either
in the northern detector D2 or in the southern detector D1. It is quite easy to
introduce an additional element in the experimental setup, that according to
the Copenhagen interpretation will make the photons behave like a wave.
A
n
N
D1
D2
s
S
B
Fig. 5 : The delayed-choice experimental setup as proposed by John Archibald
Wheeler, where a second semitransparent mirror is introduced. Following the Copen-
hagen interpretation, in this experimental situation the photons will behave like a
wave.
Wheeler proposes the following: we introduce a second semitransparent mirror
B as shown on Figure 5, and the thickness of B is calculated as a function of
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the wavelength of the light, such that the superposition of the northern beam
and the southern beam generates a wave of zero intensity.
In this experimental setup nothing will be detected in D2 and all the light
goes to D1, and the photons of the beam are forced into a total wave behavior.
Indeed, each photon interferes with itself in region B such that it is detected
with certainty in D1. So, we have two experimental setups, the one shown in
Figure 1 and the one shown in Figure 2, that only differ by the insertion of
a semitransparent mirror B. Wheeler proposes the semitransparent mirror B
to be inserted or excluded at the last moment, when the photon has already
left the source and interacted with the mirror N . Following the Copenhagen
interpretation and this experimental proposal of Wheeler, the wave behavior or
particle behavior of a quantum entity in the past, could be decided upon by an
experimental choice that is made in the present. We are dealing here with an
inversion of the cause-effect relationship, that gives rise to a total upset of the
temporal order of phenomena.
To indicate more drastically the profound subjective nature of the worldview
that follows from a consistent application of the Copenhagen interpretation,
Wheeler proposes an astronomical version of his delayed-choice experiment. He
considers the observation on earth of the light coming from a distant star. The
light reaches the earth by two paths due to the presence of a gravitational
lens, formed by a very massive galaxy between the earth and the distant star.
Wheeler observes that one may apply the scheme of Figure 1 and 2, where
instead of the semitransparent mirror A there is now the gravitational lens.
The distant star may be billions of light years away, and by the insertion or
not of the semitransparent mirror, we can force the next photon that arrives
to have traveled towards the earth in the form of a wave or of a particle. This
means according to Wheeler that we can influence the past even on time scales
comparable to the age of the universe.
Not all physicist who believe in the correctness of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation go as far as Wheeler proposes. The general conclusion of Wheeler’s
example remains however valid. The Copenhagen interpretation makes it quite
impossible to avoid the introduction of an essential effect on the nature and
behavior of the quantum entity due to the choice of the type of measurement
that is performed on it. The determination of the nature and the behavior of
a quantum entity independently of the specification of the measurement that
one is going to carry out is considered to be impossible in the Copenhagen
interpretation.
(1) The creation-discovery view: quantum entities and space.
Let us explain now in which way the creation- discovery view that we want to
bring forward is different from both of the above mentioned interpretations,
the de Broglie Bohm interpretation and the Copenhagen interpretation. It
is a realistic interpretation of quantum theory, in the sense that it considers
the quantum entity as existing in the outside world, independently of us ob-
serving it, and with an existence and behavior that is also independent of the
kind of observation to be made. In this sense it is strictly different from the
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Copenhagen interpretation, where the mere concept of quantum entity existing
independently of the measurement process is declared to be meaningless. The
creation-discovery view is however not like the de Broglie-Bohm theory, where
it is attempted to picture quantum entities as point particles moving and chang-
ing in our three-dimensional Euclidean space, and where detection is considered
just to be an observation that does not change the state of the quantum entity.
In the creation-discovery view it is taken for granted that measurements, in
general, do change the state of the entity under consideration. In this way the
view incorporates two aspects, an aspect of ‘discovery’ referring to the prop-
erties that the entity already had before the measurement started (this aspect
is independent of the measurement being made), and an aspect of ‘creation’,
referring to the new properties that are created during the act of measurement
(this aspect depends on the measurement being made).
4 The quantum machine: a general operational
formalism providing a closer approach to the
mystery.
The fact that it took so long to come to the kind of view that we propose, is
largely due to the way in which quantum mechanics arose as a physical theory.
Indeed, the development of quantum mechanics proceeded in a rather haphazard
manner, with the introduction of many ill-defined and poorly understood new
concepts.
During its first years (1890-1925, Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Louis de
Broglie, Hendrik Lorentz, Niels Bohr, Arnold Sommerfeld, and Hendrik Kramers),
quantum mechanics (commonly referred to as the ‘old quantum theory’), did not
even possess a coherent mathematical basis. In 1925 Werner Heisenberg [16] and
Erwin Schro¨dinger [17] produced the first two versions of the new quantum me-
chanics, which then were unified by Paul Dirac [18] and John Von Neumann [19]
to form what is now known as the orthodox version of quantum mechanics. The
mathematical formalism was elaborate and sophisticated, but the significance
of the basic concepts remained quite vague and unclear. The predictive suc-
cess of the theory was however so remarkable that it immediately was accepted
as constituting a fundamental contribution to physics. However, the problems
surrounding its conceptual basis led to a broad and prolonged debate in which
all the leading physicists of the time participated (Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg,
Schro¨dinger, Pauli, Dirac, Von Neumann, etc.)
The Von Neumann theory constitutes the standard mathematical model of
quantum mechanics [19]. We give now a short description of this standard
model. Those readers who are not acquainted with the jargon, are advised just
to skip the next paragraph, and proceed.
Standard quantum mechanics: the state of a quantum entity is de-
scribed by a unit vector in a separable complex Hilbert space; an
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experiment is described by a self-adjoint operator on this Hilbert
space, with as eigenvalues the possible results of the experiment.
As the result of an experiment, a state will be transformed into
the eigenstate of the self-adjoint operator corresponding to a certain
experimental result, with a probability given by the square of the
scalar product of the state vector and of the eigenstate unit vector.
It follows that, if the state of the quantum entity is not an eigenstate
of an operator associated with a given experiment, then the experi-
ment can yield any possible result, with a probability determined by
the scalar product of the state and eigenstate vectors as indicated
above. The dynamical evolution of the state of a quantum entity is
determined by the Schro¨dinger equation.
The orthodox quantum mechanics of Von Neumann is still dominant in the
classroom, although a number of variant formalisms have since been developed
with the aim of clarifying the basic conceptual shortcomings of the orthodox
theory. In the sixties and seventies, new formalisms were being investigated
by many research groups. In Geneva, the school of Josef Maria Jauch was de-
veloping an axiomatic formulation of quantum mechanics [20], and Constantin
Piron gave the proof of a fundamental representation theorem for the axiomatic
structure [21]. Gunther Ludwig’s group in Marburg [22] developed the convex
ensemble theory, and in Amherst, Massachusetts, the group of Charles Ran-
dall and David Foulis [23, 24] was elaborating an operational approach. Peter
Mittelstaedt and his group in Cologne studied the logical aspects of the quan-
tum formalism [25], while other workers (Jordan, Segal, Mackey, Varadarajan,
Emch) [26, 27] focused their attention on the algebraic structures, and Richard
Feynman developed the path integral formulation [28]. There appeared also the-
ories of phase-space quantization, of geometric quantization and quantization
by transformation of algebras.
These different formalisms all contained attempts to clarify the conceptual
labyrinth of the orthodox theory, but none succeeded in resolving the fundamen-
tal difficulties. This was because they all followed the same methodology: first
develop a mathematical structure, then pass to its physical interpretation. This
is still the procedure followed in the most recent and authoritative theoretical
developments in particle physics and unification theory, such as quantumchro-
modynamics and string theory. But from 1980 on, within the group of physicists
involved in the study of quantum structures, there arose a growing feeling that a
change of methodology was indispensable, that one should start from the physics
of the problem, and only proceed to the construction of a theory after having
clearly identified all basic concepts. Very fortunately, this change in attitude
to theory co¨ıncided with the appearance of an abundance of new experimental
results concerning many subtle aspects of microphysics, which previously could
only have been conjectured upon. We here have in mind the experiments in neu-
tron interferometry, in quantum optics, on isolated atoms, etc. The new insights
as to the nature of physical reality, resulting in part from the new experimental
data and in part from the new methodological approach, have made it possible
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to clarify some of the old quantum paradoxes and thereby to open the way to a
reformulation of quantum mechanics on an adequate physical basis.
In Brussels we have now decided to work explicitly along this new method-
ological approach, starting from the physics of the problem, and only proceeding
to the construction of a theory after having clearly identified all basic concepts
[11, 29, 30, 31]. We however want to state clearly the following. One could get
the impression that such an approach, starting from the physics of the situation
and then introducing the mathematics, solves the old problem of operationality.
Indeed, such a theory is by definition operational, since the basic mathematical
concepts are linked to well known ‘operations’ and ‘situations’ in the physical
world. Philosophically speaking however we do not believe that in this way
we shall be able to reduce quantum mechanics to a purely operational theory.
We do not believe this because we are convinced of the fact that the micro-
world contains fundamentally new aspects of reality that cannot be reduced
operationally to aspects of reality that we take from the macroscopic world that
surrounds us. But, we do think that an operational approach has to be pushed
to the limit as far as it can, because in this way we shall be able to come closer
to these new strange aspects of reality of the microworld.
We shall now describe the basic steps of our approach, illustrating it by
means of the very simple example of a quantum machine [7, 8, 9, 10, 12], which
we shall here use to explain that part of quantum mechanics that can at present
be understood.
(1) The ontological basis: the concept of entity and its states.
An entity S is in all generality described by the collection Σ of its possible states.
A state p, at the instant t, represents the physical reality of the entity S at the
time t. It represents what the entity ‘is’ at the time t. We use the concept of
the state p in the following way:
At each instant of time t an entity S is in a specific state p, that
represents the reality of the entity at the time t.
We remark that no mathematical structure is a priori assigned to this collection
of states, contrary to what is done in quantum mechanics (a Hilbert space
structure) or in classical mechanics (a phase space structure).
The quantum machine (denoted qm in the following) that we want to intro-
duce - to illustrate the concepts that are defined in a more general way - consists
of a physical entity Sqm constituted by a point particle P that can move on the
surface of a sphere, denoted surf , with center O and radius 1. The unit-vector v
giving the location of the particle on surf represents the state pv of the particle
(see Fig. 6,a). Hence the collection of all possible states of the entity Sqm that
we consider is given by Σqm = {pv | v ∈ surf}.
(2) Operational foundation: experiments and outcomes.
We acquire knowledge about the reality of the entity by performing experiments.
In this way to each entity S and its set of states Σ there corresponds a collection
of relevant experiments - we shall denote this collection by E - that can be carried
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out on the entity S. For an experiment e ∈ E we denote its outcome set by O(e)
and each outcome by x(e)i, hence O(e) = {x(e)i|i ∈ I}.
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Fig. 6 : A representation of the quantum machine. In (a) the physical entity P
is in state pv in the point v, and the elastic corresponding to the experiment eu is
installed between the two diametrically opposed points u and −u. In (b) the particle
P falls orthogonally onto the elastic and sticks to it. In (c) the elastic breaks and the
particle P is pulled towards the point u, such that (d) it arrives at the point u, and
the experiment eu gets the outcome ou1 .
Again, no a priori mathematical structure is imposed upon E .
For an entity S in a state p an experiment e can be performed and
one of the outcomes oei , i ∈ I will occur.
For our quantum machine we introduce the following experiments. For each
point u ∈ surf , we introduce the experiment eu. We consider the diametrically
opposite point −u, and install an elastic band of length 2, such that it is fixed
with one of its end-points in u and the other end-point in −u. Once the elastic
is installed, the particle P falls from its original place v orthogonally onto the
elastic, and sticks to it (Fig 6,b). The elastic then breaks and the particle P ,
attached to one of the two pieces of the elastic (Fig 6,c), moves to one of the
two end-points u or −u (Fig 6,d). Depending on whether the particle P arrives
in u (as in Fig 6) or in −u, we give the outcome xu1 or xu2 to eu. Hence for the
quantum machine we have Eqm = {eu | u ∈ surf}.
(3) Change of state resulting from an experiment.
If an experiment e is performed on an entity S in state p, and an outcome x(e)i
occurs, this state p will in general be changed into one of the states qi, i ∈ I
after the experiment.
For an entity S in a state p and an experiment e with outcomes
x(e)i, the state p is changed into one of the states qi, i ∈ I by the
performance of the experiment e.
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For the quantum machine the state pv is changed by the experiment eu into one
of the two states pu or p−u.
u
-u
P
θ
v
L2
L1
Fig. 7 : A representation of the experimental process in the plane where it takes place.
The elastic of length 2, corresponding to the experiment eu, is installed between u
and −u. The probability, P (xu
1
,pv), that the particle P ends up in point u is given
by the length of the piece of elastic L1 divided by the total length of the elastic. The
probability, P (xu
2
,pv), that the particle P ends up in point −u is given by the length
of the piece of elastic L2 divided by the total length of the elastic.
(4) Probability.
For a given entity S in a state p and an experiment e performed on this entity,
each outcome x(e)i will occur with a certain probability P (x(e)i, p), where this
probability is the limit of the relative frequency of repeated experiments. Hence
we also have ΣiP (x(e)i, p) = 1.
For an entity S in a state p and an experiment e with outcomes
{x(e)i|i ∈ I}, there is a probability P (x(e)i, p) that the outcome
x(e)i will occur and ΣiP (x(e)i, p) = 1.
For the quantum machine we make the hypothesis that the elastic band breaks
uniformly, which means that the probability that a particle in state pv, arrives
in u, is given by the length of L1 (which is 1+ cosθ) divided by the total length
of the elastic (which is 2). The probability that a particle in state pv arrives in
−u is given by the length of L2 (which is 1− cosθ) divided by the total length
of the elastic. If we denote these probabilities respectively by P (xu1 , pv) and
P (xu2 , pv) we have:
P (xu1 , pv) =
1 + cosθ
2
= cos2
θ
2
(1)
P (xu2 , pv) =
1− cosθ
2
= sin2
θ
2
(2)
In Figure 7 we represent the experimental process connected to eu in the plane
where it takes place, and we can easily calculate the probabilities corresponding
to the two possible outcomes. In order to do so we remark that the particle P
arrives in u when the elastic breaks in a point of the interval L1, and arrives in
−u when it breaks in a point of the interval L2 (see Fig. 7).
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We have remarked already that in our approach we do not demand a priori
any specific structure for the set of states, for the set of experiments or for the
probability model. This is one of the new and strong aspects of the approach.
One can question whether the structure that can be derived for such a situation
is not too general to be of any value. The method that we shall follow is however
the following: for certain specific entities we shall demand extra conditions to
be fulfilled, but these conditions will also come from the physics of the situation
and will characterise exactly these specific entities. We refer the reader to [32]
for a very detailed outline of our operational and realistic approach.
(6) The quantum machine is a quantum entity.
We can easily show that the quantum machine is an entity the description
of which is isomorphic to the quantum description of the spin of a spin 1/2
particle. Hence, speaking in the quantum jargon, the quantum machine is a
model for the spin of a spin 1/2 quantum particle. This means that we can
describe this macroscopic machine using the ordinary quantum formalism with
a two-dimensional complex Hilbert space as the carrier for the set of states of
the entity.
The quantum machine as a model for an arbitrary quantum system described
by a two dimensional Hilbert space was presented in [7, 8, 9]. It is now possible
to prove that for any arbitrary quantum entity one can construct a model like
that of the quantum machine [11, 33, 34, 35]. The explanation of the quantum
structure that is given in the quantum machine can thus also be used for general
quantum entities. We have called this explanation the ‘hidden measurement ap-
proach’, hidden measurements referring to the fact that for a real measurement
there is a ‘lack of knowledge’ about the measurement process in this approach.
For the quantum machine, for example, this lack of knowledge is the lack of
knowledge about where the elastic will break during a measurement process.
This ‘physical’ formalism has already led to a number of concrete and far
reaching results, some of which we shall explain in the following. The most
important achievement however, in my opinion, consists in an explanation of the
structure of quantum mechanics, and in identifying the reason why it appears
in a natural way in nature.
5 What are quantum structures and why do they
appear in nature?
Already in the early development of quantum mechanics it was realized that the
structure of quantum theory is very different from the structure of the existing
classical theories. This structural difference has been expressed and studied
in different mathematical categories, and we mention here some of the most
important ones:
(1) the structure of the collection of experimental propositions:
If one considers the collection of properties (experimental propositions) of a
physical entity, then it has the structure of a Boolean lattice for the case of a
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classical entity, while it is non-Boolean for the case of a quantum entity [20, 21,
36]
(2) the structure of the probability model:
The axioms formulated by Kolmogorov in 1933 relate to the classical probability
calculus as introduced for the first time by Simon Laplace. Quantum probabil-
ities do not satisfy these axioms. John Von Neumann was the first to prove a
“no go” theorem for hidden variable theories [19]. Many further developments
were however required before it was definitely proved that it is impossible to
reproduce quantum probabilities from a hidden variable theory. And quite defi-
nitely the structure of the quantum probability model is not Kolmogorovian [7,
8, 9, 23, 24, 37, 38, 39].
(3) the structure of the collection of observables:
If the collection of observables is considered, a classical entity gives rise to a
commutative algebra, while a quantum entity does not [26, 27, 40, 41].
The presence of these deep structural differences between classical theories and
quantum theory has contributed strongly to the belief that classical theories
describe the ordinary ‘understandable’ part of reality, while quantum theory
confronts us with a part of reality (the micro-world) that escapes our under-
standing. This is why the strong paradigm that quantum mechanics cannot be
understood is still in vigour. The example of our macroscopic machine with a
quantum structure challenges this paradigm, because obviously the functioning
of this machine can be understood. We now want to show that all the main
aspects of the quantum structures can indeed be explained in this way and we
shall identify the reason why they appear in nature. We shall focus here on the
explanation in the category of the probability models, and refer to [11, 42, 43,
44, 45, 46, 47] for an analysis pertinent to other categories.
The original development of probability theory aimed at a formalization of
the description of the probabilities that appear as the consequence of a lack of
knowledge. The probability structure appearing in situations of lack of knowl-
edge was axiomatized by Kolmogorov and such a probability model is now called
Kolmogorovian. Since the quantum probability model is not Kolmogorovian, it
has now generally been accepted that the quantum probabilities are not asso-
ciated with a lack of knowledge. Sometimes this conclusion is formulated by
stating that the quantum probabilities are ontological probabilities, as if they
were present in reality itself. In the approach that we follow in Brussels, and
which we have named the hidden measurement approach, we show that the
quantum probabilities can also be explained as being due to a lack of knowl-
edge, and we prove that what distinguishes quantum probabilities from classical
Kolmogorovian probabilities is the nature of this lack of knowledge. Let us go
back to the quantum machine to illustrate what we mean.
If we consider again our quantum machine (Fig. 6 and Fig. 7), and look for
the origin of the probabilities as they appear in this example, we can remark that
the probability is entirely due to a lack of knowledge about the measurement
process. Namely the lack of knowledge of where exactly the elastic breaks
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during a measurement. More specifically, we can identify two main aspects of
the experiment eu as it appears in the quantum machine.
(1) The experiment eu effects a real change on the state pv of the
entity S. Indeed, the state pv changes into one of the states pu or
p
−u by the experiment eu.
(2) The probabilities appearing are due to a lack of knowledge about
a deeper reality of the individual measurement process itself, namely
where the elastic breaks.
These two effects give rise to quantum-like structures, and the lack of knowledge
about the deeper reality of the individual measurement process comes from
‘hidden measurements’ that operate deterministically in this deeper reality [7,
8, 9, 12, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52]; and that is the origin of the name that we gave to
this approach.
One might think that our ‘hidden-measurement’ approach is in fact a ‘hidden-
variable’ theory. In a certain sense this is true. If our explanation for the
quantum structures is the correct one, quantum mechanics is compatible with
a deterministic universe on the deepest level. There is no need to introduce the
idea of an ontological probability. Why then the generally held conviction that
hidden variable theories cannot be used for quantum mechanics? The reason
is that those physicists who are interested in trying out hidden variable theo-
ries, are not at all interested in the kind of theory that we propose here. They
want the hidden variables to be hidden variables of the state of the entity under
study, so that the probability is associated to a lack of knowledge about the
deeper reality of this entity; as we have mentioned already this gives rise to
a Kolmogorovian probability theory. This kind of hidden variables relating to
states is indeed impossible for quantum mechanics for structural reasons, with
exception of course in the de Broglie-Bohm theory: there, in addition to the hid-
den state variables, a new spooky entity of ‘quantum potential’ is introduced in
order to express the action of the measurement as a change in the hidden state
variables; and as we have already remarked, the description of more than one
entity causes deep problems.
If one wants to interpret our hidden measurements as hidden variables, then
they are hidden variables of the measuring apparatus and not of the entity
under study. In this sense they are highly contextual, since each experiment
introduces a different set of hidden variables. They differ from the variables of
a classical hidden variable theory, because they do not provide an ‘additional
deeper’ description of the reality of the physical entity. Their presence, as vari-
ables of the experimental apparatus, has a well defined philosophical meaning,
and expresses the fact that we, human beings, want to construct a model of
reality independent of our experience of this reality. The reason is that we look
for ‘properties’ or ‘relations between properties’, and these are defined by our
ability to make predictions independent of our experience. We want to model
the structure of the world, independently of our observing and experimenting
with this world. Since we do not control these variables in the experimental
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apparatus, we do not allow them in our model of reality, and the probability
introduced by them cannot be eliminated from a predictive theoretical model.
In the macroscopic world, because of the availability of many experiments with
negligible fluctuations, we find an ‘almost’ deterministic model.
We must now try to understand the consequences of our explanation of
the quantum structure for our understanding of the nature of reality. Since
some of the less mathematically oriented readers may have had some difficulties
in following our explanation of quantum mechanics by means of the quantum
machine we shall now give a second, more metaphorical and less technical,
example of our creation-discovery view.
6 Cracking walnuts and quantum mechanics.
Consider the following experiment: ‘we take a walnut out of a basket, and break
it open in order to eat it’. Let us look closely at the way we crack the nut. We
don’t use a nutcracker, but simply take the nut between the palms of our two
hands, press as hard as we can, and see what happens. Everyone who has tried
this knows that different things can happen. A first possibility to envisage is
that the nut is mildewed. If after cracking the shell the walnut turns out to be
mildewed, then we don’t eat it.
Assume for a moment that the only property of the nut that plays a role
in our eating it or not is the property of being mildewed or not. Assume now
that there are N walnuts in the basket. Then, for a given nut k (we have
1 ≤ k ≤ N), there are always two possible results for our experiment: E1,
we crack the nut and eat it (and then following our hypothesis, it was not
mildewed); E2, we crack the nut and don’t eat it (and then it was mildewed).
Suppose thatM of the N nuts in the basket are mildewed. Then the probability
that our experiment for a nut k yields the result E1 is given by the ratio
(N−M)
N
,
and that it yields the result E2, by
N
M
. These probabilities are introduced by
our lack of knowledge of the complete physical reality for the nut. Indeed, the
nut k is either mildewed or not before we proceed to break it open. Had we
known about its being mildewed without having to crack the nut, then we could
have eliminated the probability statement, which is simply the expression of our
lack of knowledge about the deeper unknown reality of the nut. We could have
selected the nuts for eating by removing from the basket all the mildewed ones
The classical probability calculus is based, as above, upon a priori assumptions
as to the nature of existing probabilities.
Everyone who has had any experience in cracking walnuts knows that other
things can happen. Sometimes, we crush the nut upon cracking the shell. We
then have to make an assessment of the damage incurred, and decide whether
or not it is worth while to try and separate out the nut from the fragments of
the shell. If not, we don’t eat the nut. Taking into account this more realistic
situation, we have to drop our hypothesis that the only factor determining our
eating the nut is the mildew, existing before the cracking. Now there are two
factors: the mildew, and the state of the nut ‘after’ the act of cracking. Again
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we have two possible results for our experiment: E1, we don’t eat the nut (then
it was mildewed or is crushed upon cracking); and E2, we eat it (then it was
not mildewed and cleanly cracked). For a given nut k these two possible results
will occur with a certain probability. We perceive immediately that this sort
of probability depends on the way we crack the nut, and is thus of a different
nature from the one only related to the presence of mildewed nuts. Before
cracking the nuts, there is no way of separating out those which will be cleanly
cracked and those which will be crushed. This distinction cannot be made
because it is partly created by the cracking experiment itself. This is a nice
example of how aspects of physical reality can be created by the measurement
itself, namely, the cracking open of the walnuts, and it can be clearly understood
why the probability that comes in by this effect is of another nature and cannot
be eliminated by looking for a deeper description of the entity under study.
We can state now easily our general creation-discovery view for the case
of the nuts. The mildewed nature of the nut is a property that the nut has
before and independently of the fact that we break it. When we break the
nut and find out that it is mildewed, then this finding is a ‘discovery’. These
discoveries, related to outcomes of experiments, obey a classical probability
calculus, expressing our lack of knowledge about something that was already
there before we made the experiment. The crushed or cleanly cracked nature of
the nut is not a discovery of the experiment of cracking. It is a creation. Indeed,
depending on how we perform the experiment, and on all other circumstantial
factors during the experiment, some nuts will come out crushed, while others
will be cleanly cracked.
The mathematical structure of the probability model necessary to describe
the probabilities for cleanly cracked or crushed nuts is quite different from that
needed for mildewed or non-mildewed ones. More specifically:
The probability structure corresponding to the indeterminism result-
ing from a lack of knowledge of an existing physical reality is a clas-
sical Kolmogorov probability model.
The probability structure corresponding to the indeterminism result-
ing from the fact that during a measurement new elements of physical
reality, which thus did not exist before the measurement, are created
is a quantum-like probability model.
Quantum probabilities can thus be taken as resulting from a lack of knowledge of
the interaction between the measuring apparatus and the quantum entity during
the measuring experiment. This interaction creates new elements of physical
reality which did not exist before the measurement. This is the explanation
which we propose to account for quantum probabilities.
We should point out that the non-Kolmogorovian nature of the probability
model corresponding to situations of creation cannot be shown for the case of
a single experiment, as considered. At least three different experiments with
two outcomes of the creation type are necessary to prove in a formal way that
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a description within a Kolmogorovian model is not possible. We refer to [7, 8,
9] for the details of such a proof for the quantum spin 1/2 model. The fact that
we need at least three experiments does not however suppress the fact that the
physical origin of the non-Kolmogorovian behavior is clearly due to the presence
of explicit creation aspects [52].
Let us now assume that we have removed all the mildewed walnuts from the
basket. We then have the situation where none of the nuts are mildewed. In the
physicist’s jargon we say that the individual nuts are in a pure state, relative to
the property of being mildewed or not. In the original situation when there were
still mildewed nuts present, an individual nut was in a mixed state, mildewed
and not mildewed, with weighting factors M
N
and (N−M)
N
. In the new situation
with the basket containing only non-mildewed nuts, we consider an event m:
we take a non-mildewed walnut, and carry out the measurement consisting in
cracking the nut. We have here the two possible results: E1, the nut is cleanly
cracked and we eat it; E2, the nut is crushed and we don’t eat it. The result
depends on what takes place during the cracking experiment. We therefore here
introduce the concept of potentiality. For the case of mildewed or non-mildewed
nuts we could assert for each nut that, previously to the experiment, the nut
was mildewed or not. For the case of cleanly cracked or crushed nuts, we cannot
relate the outcome of the cracking to any anterior property of the walnut. What
we can assert however is that each walnut is potentially cleanly cracked (and
will then be eaten), or potentially crushed (and then will not be eaten).
Nobody will have any difficulty in understanding the walnut example. What
we propose is that one should try to understand quantum reality in a similar
manner. The only difference is that for the measurements in quantum mechan-
ics which introduce a probability of the second type (i.e. with the creation of a
new element of physical reality during the measurement), we find it difficult to
visualize just what this creation is. This is the case for instance for detection
experiments of a quantum entity. Intuitively, we associate the detection process
with the determination of a spatial position which already exists. But now, we
must learn to accept that the detection of a quantum entity involves, at least
partially, the creation of the position of the particle during the detection pro-
cess. Walnuts are potentially cleanly cracked or crushed, and likewise quantum
entities are potentially within a given region of space or potentially outside it.
The experiment consisting in finding or not finding a quantum entity in a given
region takes place only after setting up in the laboratory the measuring appara-
tus used for the detection, and it requires the interaction of the quantum entity
with that measuring apparatus. Consequently, the quantum entity is potentially
present and potentially not present in the region of space considered.
It will be observed that this description of quantum measurements makes it
necessary to reconsider our concept of space. If a quantum entity in a superpo-
sition state between two separated regions of space is only potentially present in
both of these region of space, then space is no longer the setting for the whole
of physical reality. Space, as we intuitively understand it, is in fact a structure
within which classical relations between macroscopic physical entities are estab-
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lished. These macroscopic entities are always present in space, because space is
essentially the structure in which we situate these entities. This need not be,
and is not the case for quantum entities. In its normal state, a quantum entity
does not exist in space, it is only by means of a detection experiment that it is,
as it were, pulled into space. The action of being pulled into space introduces
a probability of the second type (the type associated with cracking the walnuts
open), since the position of the quantum entity is partially created during the
detection process.
Let us consider now a neutron (photon) in Rauch’s experiment (Wheeler’s
delayed-choice experiment) and let us describe this situation within the creation-
discovery view. We accept that the neutron (photon) while it travels between the
source and the detector is not inside space. It remains a single entity traveling
through reality and the two paths n and s are regions of space where the neutron
(photon) can be detected more easily than in other regions of space when a
detection experiment is carried out. The detection experiment is considered
to contain explicitly a creation element and pulls the neutron (photon) inside
space. If no detection experiment is carried out, and no physical apparatuses
related to this detection experiment are put into place, the neutron (photon) is
not traveling on one of the two paths n or s.
We can understand now how the ‘subjective’ part of the Copenhagen in-
terpretation disappears. In the creation- discovery view the choice of the mea-
surement, whether we choose to detect or to make an interference experiment,
does not influence the intrinsic nature of the quantum entity. In both choices
the quantum entity is traveling outside space, and the effect of an experiment
appears only when the measurement related to the experiment starts. If a de-
tection measurement is chosen the quantum entity starts to get pulled into a
place in space where it localizes. If an interference experiment is chosen the
quantum entity remains outside space, not localized, and interacts from there
with the macroscopic material apparatuses and the fields, and this interaction
gives rise to the interference pattern.
7 Were do the quantum paradoxes go?
We have analyzed in foregoing sections the manner in which the creation-
discovery view resolves the problems that are connected to the de Broglie theory
and the Copenhagen interpretation. We would like to say now some words about
the quantum paradoxes. Our main conclusion relative to the quantum paradoxes
is the following: some are due to intrinsic structural shortcomings of the ortho-
dox theory, while others find their origin in the nature of reality, and are due to
the pre-scientific preconception about space that we have been able to explain.
In this way we can state that the generalized quantum theories together with
the creation-discovery view resolve the well-known quantum paradoxes. We do
not have the space here to go into all the delicate aspects of the paradoxes, and
refer therefore to the literature. We shall however present a sufficiently detailed
analysis of certain cases, so that it becomes clear how the paradoxes are solved
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within the generalized quantum theories and the creation-discovery view.
(1) The measurement problem and Schro¨dinger’s cat paradox :
If one tries to apply orthodox quantum mechanics to describe a system contain-
ing both a quantum entity and the macroscopic measuring apparatus, one is
led to very strange predictions. It was Schro¨dinger who discussed this problem
in detail, so let us consider the matter from the point of view of his cat [53].
Schro¨dinger imagined the following thought experiment. He considered a room
containing a radioactive source and a detector to detect the radioactive parti-
cles emitted. In the room there is also a flask of poison and a living cat. The
detector is switched on for a length of time such there is exactly a probability
1/2 of detecting a radioactive particle emitted by the source. Upon detecting
a particle, the detector triggers a mechanism which breaks the flask, liberating
the poison and killing the cat. If no particle is detected, nothing happens, and
the cat stays alive. We can know the result of the experiment only when we go
into the room to see what has happened. If we apply the orthodox quantum
formalism to describe the experiment (cat included), then, until the moment
that we open the door, the state of the cat, which we denote by pcat, is a su-
perposition of the two states “the cat is dead”, written pdead, and “the cat is
alive”, written plive. Thus, pcat = (pdead + plive)/
√
2.
The superposition is suppressed, giving a change in the quantum mechani-
cal state, only at the instant when we go into the room to see what has taken
place. We first want to remark that if we interpret the state as described by
the orthodox quantum mechanical wave function as a mathematical object giv-
ing exclusively our knowledge of the system, then there would be no problem
with Schro¨dinger’s cat. Indeed, from the point of view of our knowledge of the
state, we can assume that before opening the door of the room the cat was al-
ready dead or was still alive, and that the quantum mechanical change of state
simply corresponds to the change in our knowledge of the state. This knowl-
edge picture would also resolve another problem. According to the orthodox
quantum formalism, the superposition state pcat = (pdead+ plive)/
√
2 is instan-
taneously transformed, at the instant when one opens the door, into one of the
two component states pdead or plive. This sudden change of the state, which in
the quantum mechanical jargon is called the collapse of the wave function, thus
has a very natural explanation in the knowledge picture. Indeed, if the wave
function describes our knowledge of the situation, then the acquisition of new
information, as for instance by opening a door, can give rise to an arbitrarily
sudden change of our knowledge and hence also of the wave function.
The knowledge picture cannot however be correct, because it is a hidden
variable theory. Indeed, the quantum mechanical wave function does not de-
scribe the physical reality itself, which exists independently of our knowledge
of it, but describes only our knowledge of the physical reality. It would then
follow, if the knowledge picture is correct, that there must exist an underlying
level of reality which is not described by a quantum mechanical wave function.
For the cat experiment, this underlying level describes the condition of the cat,
dead or alive, independently of the knowledge of this condition we acquire by
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entering the room. The knowledge picture therefore leads directly to a hidden
variable theory, where hidden variables describe the underlying level of reality.
As we mentioned already, it can be shown that a probabilistic theory, in which a
lack of knowledge of an underlying level of reality lies at the origin of the prob-
abilistic description (a hidden variable theory), always satisfies Kolmogorov’s
axioms. Now, the quantum mechanical theory does not satisfy these axioms, so
that the knowledge picture is necessarily erroneous. One also has direct exper-
imental evidence, in connection with the Bell inequalities, which confirms that
any state-type hidden variable hypothesis is wrong.
Hence, the quantum mechanical wave function represents not our knowledge
of the system, but its real physical state, independently of whether the latter
is known or not. In that case, however, Schro¨dinger’s cat presents us with a
problem. Is it really possible that, before the door of the room is opened, the cat
could be in a superposition state, neither living nor dead, and that this state,
as a result of opening of the door, is transformed into a dead or live state?
It does seem quite impossible that the real world could react in this manner
to our observation of it. A physical reality such that its states can come into
being simply because we observe it, is so greatly in contradiction with all our
real experience that we can hardly take this idea seriously. Yet it does seem to
be an unescapable consequence of orthodox quantum mechanics as applied to a
global physical situation, with macroscopic components.
In the new physical general description that we have proposed [29, 30, 31,
32] it is perfectly possible and even very natural to make a distinction between
different types of experiments. One will thus introduce the concept of a classical
experiment: this is an experiment such that, for each state p of the entity S,
there is a well-determined result x. For a classical experiment, the result is fully
predictable even before the experiment is carried out. A collection E of relevant
experiments will generally comprise both classical and non-classical ones. It is
possible to prove a theorem stating that the classical part of the description of
an entity can always be separated out [29, 31, 54]. The collection of all possible
states for an entity can then be expressed as the union of a collection of classical
mixtures, such that each classical mixture is determined by a set of non-classical
micro-states. When we formulate within this general framework the axioms of
quantum mechanics, it can be shown that the set of states in a classical mix-
ture can be represented by a Hilbert space. The collection of all the states of
the entity is then described by an infinite collection of Hilbert spaces, one for
each classical mixture. Orthodox quantum mechanics is in this formulation the
limiting case for which no classical measurement appears, corresponding effec-
tively to the existence of a single Hilbert space. Classical mechanics is the other
limiting case, which is such that only classical measurements are present, and
for which the formulation corresponds to a phase space description. The gen-
eral case for an arbitrary entity is neither purely quantum nor purely classical,
and can only be described by a collection of different Hilbert spaces. When
one considers the measuring process within this general formulation, there is no
Schro¨dinger cat paradox. Opening the door is a classical operation which does
not change the state of the cat, and the state can thus also be described within
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the general formulation, and the quantum collapse occurs when the radioactive
particle is detected by the detector, which is a non-classical process, also within
the general description.
The general formalism provides more than the resolution of the Schro¨dinger
cat paradox. It makes it possible to consider quantum mechanics and classi-
cal mechanics as two particular cases of a more general theory. This general
theory is quantum-like, but introduces no paradoxes for the measuring process
because one can treat, within the same formalism, the measuring apparatus
as a classical entity, and the entity to be measured as a quantum entity. The
paradoxes associated with measurements result from the structural limitations
of the orthodox quantum formalism. This decomposition theorem of a general
description into an direct product of irreducible descriptions, where each irre-
ducible description corresponds to one Hilbert space, had been shown already
within the mathematical generalizations of quantum mechanics [20, 21]. The
aim then was to give an explanation for the existence of super-selection rules.
The decomposition was later generalized for the physical formalisms [29, 31, 54].
(2) The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox :
The general existence of superposition states which lies at the root of the
Schro¨dinger cat paradox, was exploited by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR)
to construct a far subtler paradoxical situation. EPR consider the case of two
separated entities S1 and S2, and the composite entity S which these two entities
constitute. They show that it is always possible to bring the composite entity
S in a state in such a manner that a measurement on one of the component
entities determines the state of the other component entity. For separated enti-
ties, this is a quantum mechanical prediction which contradicts the very concept
of separateness. Indeed, for separated entities the state of one of the entities
can a priori not be affected by how one acts upon the other entity, and this is
confirmed by all experiments which one can carry out on separated entities.
Here again, we can resolve the paradox by considering the situation in the
framework of the new general formalism. There, one can show that a composite
entity S, made up of two separated entities S1 and S2, never satisfies the axioms
of orthodox quantum mechanics, even if allowance is made for classical experi-
ments as was done in the case of the measurement paradox [11, 29, 30]. Two of
the axioms of orthodox quantum mechanics (weak modularity, and the covering
law) are never satisfied for the case of an entity S made up of two separated
quantum entities S1 and S2. This failure of orthodox quantum mechanics is
structurally much more far-reaching than that relating to the measuring prob-
lem. There one could propose a solution in which the unique Hilbert space of
orthodox quantum mechanics is replaced by a collection of Hilbert spaces, and
one remains more or less within the framework of the Hilbert space formalism
(this is the way that super-selection rules were described even within one Hilbert
space). The impossibility of describing separated entities in orthodox quantum
mechanics is rooted in the vector space structure of the Hilbert space itself.
The two unsatisfied axioms are those associated with the vector space structure
of the Hilbert space, and to dispense with these axioms, as is required if we
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wish to describe separated entities, we must therefore construct a totally new
mathematical structure for the space of states [55, 56, 57].
(3) Classical, quantum and intermediate structures.
To abandon the vector space structure for the collection Σ of all possible states
for an entity is a radical mathematical operation, but recent developments have
confirmed its necessity. The possibility of accommodating within one general
formalism both quantum and classical entities has resolved the measurement
paradox. If the quantum structure can be explained by the presence of a lack
of knowledge on the measurement process, as it is the case in our ‘hidden-
measurement’ approach, we can go a step further, and wonder what types of
structure arise when we consider the original models, with a lack of knowledge
on the measurement process, and introduce a variation of the magnitude of this
lack of knowledge. We have studied the quantum machine under varying ‘lack
of knowledge’, parameterizing this variation by a number ǫ ∈ [0, 1], such that
ǫ = 1 corresponds to the situation of maximal lack of knowledge, giving rise
to a quantum structure, and ǫ = 0 corresponds to the situation of zero lack of
knowledge, generating a classical structure, and other values of ǫ correspond to
intermediate situations, giving rise to a structure that is neither quantum nor
classical [4, 45, 46, 47, 58, 59, 60]. We have called this model the ǫ-model, and
we have been able to proof that here again the same two axioms, weak modu-
larity and the covering law, cannot be satisfied for the intermediate situations -
between quantum and classical [4, 45, 46, 47, 58, 59]. A new theory dispensing
with these two axioms would allow for the description not only of structures
which are quantum, classical, mixed quantum-classical, but also of intermediate
structures, which are neither quantum nor classical. This is then a theory for
the mesoscopic region of reality, and we can now understand why such a theory
could not be built within the orthodox theories, quantum or classical.
8 Standard quantum mechanics as a first order
non classical theory.
As our ǫ version of the quantum machine shows, there are different quantum-
like theories possible, all giving rise to quantum-like probabilities, that however
differ numerically from the probabilities of orthodox quantum mechanics. These
intermediate theories may allow us to generate models for the mesoscopic enti-
ties, and our group in Brussels is now investigating this possibility. The current
state of affairs is the following: quantum mechanics and classical mechanics are
both extremal theories, corresponding relatively to a situation with maximum
lack of knowledge and a situation with zero lack of knowledge on the interaction
between measuring apparatus and the physical entity under study. Most real
physical situations will however correspond to a situation with a lack of knowl-
edge of the interaction with the measuring apparatus that is neither maximal
nor zero, and as a consequence the theory describing this situation will have
a structure that is neither quantum nor classical. It will be quantum-like, in
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the sense that the states are changed by the measurements, and that there is a
probability involved as in quantum mechanics, but the numerical value of this
probability will be different from the numerical value of the orthodox quantum
mechanical probabilities. If this is the case, why does orthodox quantum me-
chanics has so much success, both in general and in its numerical predictions?
In this section we want to suggest an answer to this question. Let us consider
the case of an entity S, and two possible states pu and pv corresponding to this
entity. We also consider all possible measurements that can be performed on
this entity S, with the only restriction that for each measurement considered
it must be possible that, when the entity is in the state pv, it can be changed
by the measurement into the state pu. Among these measurements there will
be deterministic classical measurements, there will be quantum measurements,
but there will also be super-quantum measurements (giving rise to a proba-
bility greater than that predicted by quantum mechanics) and sub-quantum
measurements (giving rise to a probability that lies between classical and quan-
tum predictions). All these different measurements are considered. We suppose
now that we cannot distinguish between these measurements, and hence the ac-
tual measurement that we perform, and which we denote ∆(u, v), is a random
choice between all these possible measurements. We shall call this measurement
the ‘universal’ measurement connecting pv and pu. We may remark that if we
believe that there is ‘one’ reality then also there is only ‘one’ universal mea-
surement ∆(u, v) connecting pv and pu. We now ask what is the probability
P∆(pu, pv) that by performing the universal measurement ∆(u, v), the state pv
is changed into the state pu.
There is a famous theorem in quantum mechanics that makes it possible for
us to show that the universal transition probability P∆(pu, pv) corresponding
to a universal measurement ∆(u, v) connecting states pu and pv is the quantum
transition probability Pq(pu, pv) connecting these two states pv and pu. This is
Gleason’s theorem.
Gleason’s theorem proves that, for a given vector u of a Hilbert space H, of
dimension at least 3, there exists only one probability measure µu on the set of
closed subspaces of this Hilbert space, with value 1 on the ray generated by u,
and this is exactly the probability measure used to calculate the quantum tran-
sition probability from any state to this ray generated by u. Gleason’s theorem
is only valid for a Hilbert space of dimension at least three. The essential part
of the demonstration consists in proving the result for a three-dimensional real
Hilbert space. Indeed, the three-dimensional real Hilbert space case contains al-
ready all the aspects that make Gleason’s theorem such a powerful result. This
is also the reason that we here restrict our ‘interpretation’ of Gleason’s result
to the case of a three dimensional real Hilbert space.
Theorem (Gleason) : The only positive function w(pv) that is defined
on the rays pv of a three dimensional real Hilbert space R
3, and that
has value 1 for a given ray pu, and that is such that w(px)+w(py)+
w(pz) = 1 if the three rays px, py, pz are mutually orthogonal, is
given by w(pv) = | < u, v > |2
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Let us now consider two states pu and pv, and a measurement e (which is
not a priori taken to be a quantum measurement) that has three eigenstates
pu, py and pz, which means that it transforms any state into one of these
three states after the measurement. The probability Pe(pu, pv), that the mea-
surement e transforms the state pv into the state pu is given by a positive
function f(v, u, x, y) that can depend on the four vectors v, u, x and y. In
the same way we have Pe(px, pv) = f(v, x, y, u), Pe(py, pv) = f(v, y, u, x),
and f(v, u, x, y) + f(v, x, y, u) + f(v, y, u, x) = 1. This is true, independent
of the nature of the measurement e. If e is a quantum measurement, then
f(v, u, x, y) = | < v, u > |2, and the dependence on x and y disappears, because
the quantum transition probability only depends on the state before the mea-
surement and the eigen state of the measurement that is actualized, but not on
the other eigenstates of the measurement. Gleason’s theorem states that ‘if the
transition probability depends only on the state before the measurement and
on the eigenstate of the measurement that is actualized after the measurement,
then this transition probability is equal to the quantum transition probability’.
But this Gleason property (dependence of the transition probability only on
the state before the measurement and the eigenstate that is actualized after the
measurement) is precisely a property that is satisfied by what we have called
the ‘universal’ measurements. Indeed, by definition, the transition probability
for a universal measurement only depends on the state before the measure-
ment and the actualized state after the measurement. Hence Gleason’s theorem
shows that the transition probabilities connected with universal measurements
are quantum mechanical transition probabilities.
We now go a step further and proceed to interpret the quantum measure-
ments as if they are universal measurements. This means that quantum me-
chanics is taken to be the theory that describes the probabilistics of possible
outcomes for measurements which are mixtures of all imaginable types of mea-
surements. Quantum mechanics is then the first order non-classical theory. It
describes the statistics that goes along with a random choice between any arbi-
trary type of manipulation that changes the state pv of the system under study
into the state pu, in such a way that we know nothing of the mechanism of this
change of state. The only information we have is that ‘possibly’ the state before
the measurement, namely pv, is changed into a state after the measurement,
namely pu. If this is a correct explanation for quantum statistics, it accounts
for its success in so many regions of reality, both in general and also for its
numerical predictions.
9 Relativity theory: is reality vanishing?
When James Clerck Maxwell developed his field theory for electromagnetic ra-
diation the seeds were sown of a problem of the ‘the classical mechanical view’.
Indeed, while the classical mechanical equations are invariant for Galilean trans-
formations - this invariance expresses mathematically an additional intuition
within our intuitive view on reality, namely, that the laws of physics remain the
same in another coordinate system moving relatively to us with constant veloc-
ity - Maxwell’s equations turn out to be invariant for a totally different type
of transformations. The problem was recognized by Hendrik Antoon Lorentz -
hence the name ’Lorentz transformation’ given to this new set of transforma-
tions - as also by Henri Poincare´ and others, around the turn of the century.
As the story goes, the young Albert Einstein also pondered on this problem as
a physics student, and his reflection was at the origin of the article in which he
formulated the theory of relativity [61].
In relativity theory a very subtle but straightforward fundamental subjective
element is introduced within the nature of reality itself. It is well recognized in
broad circles that the meaning of quantum mechanics as related to the nature
of reality has not yet been understood. For relativity theory there seems to be
however a common belief, and this is certainly partly due to the straightforward
operational manner in which the theory was introduced by Albert Einstein,
that its consequences for the nature of reality have been well understood by
the specialists. As our analysis will show - and contrary to what is believed by
many physicists - the profound meaning of relativity theory for the nature of
reality has not yet been understood at all.
Usually relativity theory is introduced with a seemingly very well defined
ontological basis [62]. The collection of events, each event parametrized by
four real numbers (x0, x1, x2, x3), is considered to be the basic structure of the
theory. For a particular observator connected to a particular reference frame,
there is no problem of how to use this four-dimensional time-space manifold
scheme to decide what ‘his personal reality’ is. His personal reality is indeed
the ‘space-cut’ that his reference frame makes with the four-dimensional time-
space manifold. This space-cut, however, only determines a reality connected to
a particular reference frame, and at first sight it is not possible to put together
the space-cuts of different reference frames in such a manner that they form one
reality. All this is well known, and this problem was in fact already at the origin
of the construction of special relativity in the original paper by Albert Einstein,
namely his critique on the concept of simultaneity [61].
But there is a fundamental problem in relativity theory in relation to the
question: “What is reality?”. Sometimes the statement is made rather vaguely
and never with a sound conceptual basis, that reality in relativity theory ‘is’
the four-dimensional time-space continuum. But if this position is taken, there
is another major conceptual problem: indeed then there is no change and no
evolution in time. Eventually we could still accept that material reality would
be frozen in four dimensions, but then the question remains: what are we? I
myself, and I suppose also all of you readers, am convinced of the fact that I am
not my past and my future. I am now. In this way, relativity theory conflicts
with our deep intuition about the nature of reality in a manner such that we
can not even well identify just where the contradiction lies. We have analysed in
great detail this situation in [63, 64], and shall come back to it after introducing
an operational definition for reality such that we can detect what is the ‘real’
mystery.
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(1) Experiences.
The basic concept in our analysis of the operational foundation of reality is that
of an experience. An experience is the interaction between a participator and
a piece of the world. When the participator lives such an experience, we shall
say that this experience is present, and we shall call it the present experience
of the participator. We remark that we consciously use the word ‘participator’
instead of the word ‘observer’ to indicate that we consider the cognitive receiver
to participate creatively in his cognitive act. When we consider a measurement,
then we conceive that for this situation the experimentator and his experimental
apparatus together constitute the participator, and that the physical entity
under study is the piece of the world that interacts with the participator. The
experiment is the experience.
Let us give some examples of experiences. Consider the following situation:
I am inside my house in Brussels. It is night, the windows are shut. I sit in
a chair, reading a novel. I have a basket filled with walnuts at my side, and
from time to time I take one of them, crack it and eat it. My son is in bed and
already asleep. New York exists and is busy.
Let us enumerate the experiences that are considered in such a situation:
(1) E1(I read a novel)
(2) E2(I experience the inside of my house in Brussels)
(3) E3(I experience that it is night)
(4) E4(I take a walnut, crack it and eat it)
(5) E5(I see that my son is in bed and asleep)
(6) E6(I experience that New York is busy)
The first very important remark I want to make is that obviously I do not
experience all these experiences at once. On the contrary, in principle, I only
experience one experience at once, namely my present experience. Let us sup-
pose that my present experience is E1(I read a novel). Then a lot of other
things happen while I am living this present experience. These things happen
in my present reality. While ’I am reading the novel’ some of the happenings
that happen are the following: H1(the novel exists), H2(the inside of my house
in Brussels exists), H3(it is night), H4(the basket and the walnuts exist, and
are at my side), H5(my son is in bed and is sleeping), H6(New York exists and
is busy). All the happenings, and much more, happen while I live the present
experience E1(I read a novel).
Why is the structure of reality such that what I am just saying is evident
for everybody (and therefore shows that we are not conscious of the structure
and construction that is behind this evidence)?
Certainly it is not because I experience also these other happenings. My only
present experience is the experience of reading the novel. But, and this is the
origin of the specific structure and construction of reality, I could have chosen
to live an experience including one of the other happenings in replacement of
my present experience. Let me recapitulate the list of the experiences that I
could have chosen to experience in replacement of my present experience: E2(I
observe that I am inside my house in Brussels), E3(I see that it is night), E4(I
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take a walnut, crack it and eat it), E5(I go and look in the bedroom to see that
my son is asleep), E6(I take the plane to New York and see that it is busy).
This example indicates how reality is structured by us.
First of all we have tried to identify two main aspects of an experience. The
aspect that is controlled and created by me, and the aspect that just happens to
me and can only be known by me. Let us introduce this important distinction
in a formal way.
(2) Creations and happenings.
To see what I mean, let us consider the experience E4(I take a walnut, crack
it and eat it). In this experience, there is an aspect that is an action of me,
the taking and the cracking, and the eating. There is also an aspect that is an
observation of me, the walnut and the basket. By studying how our senses work,
I can indeed say that it is the light reflected on the walnut, and on the basket,
that gives me the experience of walnut and the experience of basket. This is
an explanation that only now can be given; it is, however, not what was known
in earlier days when the first world-models of humanity were constructed. But
without knowing the explanation delivered now by a detailed analysis, we could
see very easily that an experience contains always two aspects, a creation-aspect,
and an observation-aspect, simply because our will can only control part of the
experience. This is the creation-aspect.
For example, in E1(I read a novel) the reading is created by me, but the novel
is not created by me. In general we can indicate for an experience the aspect
that is created by me and the aspect that is not created by me. The aspect not
created by me lends itself to my creation. We can reformulate an experience
in the following way: E4(I take a walnut, crack it and eat it) becomes E4(The
walnut is taken by me, and lends itself to my cracking and eating) and E1(I
read a novel) becomes E1(The novel lends itself to my reading). The taking,
cracking, eating, and reading will be called creations or actions and will be
denoted by C4(I take, crack and eat) and C1(I read). The walnut and the novel
will be called happenings and will be denoted by H4(The walnut) and H7(The
novel).
A creation is that aspect of an experience created, controlled, and
acted upon by me, and a happening is that aspect of an experience
lending itself to my creation, control and action.
An experience is determined by a description of the creation and a description
of the happening. Creations are often expressed by verbs: to take, to crack, to
eat, and to read, are the verbs that describe my creations in the examples. The
walnut and the novel are happenings that have the additional property of being
objects, which means happening with a great stability. Often happenings are
expressed by a substantive.
Every one of my experiences E consists of one of my creations C
and one of my happenings H, so we can write E = (C,H).
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A beautiful image that can be used as a metaphor for our model of the world
is the image of the skier. A skier skis downhill. At every instant he or she has
to be in complete harmony with the form of the mountain under-neath. The
mountain is the happening. The actions of the skier are the creation. The skier’s
creation, in harmony fused with the skier’s happening, is his or her experience.
(3) The structure and construction of reality, present, past and future.
Let us again consider the collection of experiences: E1(I read a novel), E2(I
observe that I am inside my house in Brussels), E3(I see that it is night), E4(I
take a walnut, crack it and eat it), E5(I go and look in the bedroom to see that
my son is asleep) and E6(I take the plane to New York and see that it is busy).
Let us now represent the structure and construction of reality that is made out
of this small collection of experiences.
E1(I read a novel) is my present experience. In my past I could, however,
at several moments have chosen to do something else and this choice would
have led me to have another present experience than E1(I read a novel). For
example: One minute ago I could have decided to stop reading and observe that
I am inside the house. Then E2(I observe that I am inside my house in Brussels)
would have been my present experience. Two minutes ago I could have decided
to stop reading and open the windows and see that it is night. Then E3(I see
that it is night) would have been my present experience. Three minutes ago
I could have decided to stop reading, take a walnut from the basket, crack it,
and eat it. Then E4(I take a walnut, crack it and eat it) would have been my
present experience. Ten minutes ago I could have decided to go and see in the
bedroom whether my son is asleep. Then E5(I go and look in the bedroom to
see that my son is asleep) would have been my present experience.
Ten hours ago I could have decided to take a plane and fly to New York and
see how busy it was. then E6(I go to New York and see that it is busy) would
have been my present experience.
Even when they are not the happening aspect of my present experi-
ence, happenings ’happen’ at present if they are the happening aspect
of an experience that I could have lived in replacement of my present
experience, if I had so decided in my past.
The fact that a certain experience E consisting of a creation C and an happening
H is for me a possible present experience depends on two factors:
(1) I have to be able to perform the creation.
(2) The happening has to be available.
For example, the experience E2(I observe that I am inside my house in Brussels)
is a possible experience for me, if:
(1) I can perform the creation that consists in observing the inside of my house
in Brussels. In other words, if this creation is in my personal power.
(2) The happening ’the inside of my house in Brussels’ has to be available to
me. In other words, this happening has to be contained in my personal reality.
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The collection of all creations that I can perform at the present I
will call my present personal power. The collection of all happenings
that are available to me at the present I will call my present personal
reality.
I define as my present personal reality the collection of these happenings, the
collection of happenings that are available to one of my creations if I had used
my personal power in such a way that at the present I fuse one of these creations
with one of these happenings.
My present personal reality consists of all happenings that are avail-
able to me at present. My past reality consists of all happenings
that were available to me in the past. My future reality consists of
all happenings that will be available to me in the future. My present
personal power consists of all creations that I can perform at present.
My past personal power consists of all the creations that I could per-
form in the past. My future personal power consists of all creations
I shall be able to perform in the future.
Happenings can happen ’together and at once’, because to happen a happen-
ing does not have to be part of my present experience. It is sufficient that it
is available, and things can be available simultaneously. Therefore, although
my present experience is only one, my present personal reality consists of an
enormous amount of happenings all happening simultaneously.
This concept of reality is not clearly understood in present physical theories.
Physical theories know how to treat past, present and future. But reality is a
construction about the possible. It is a construction about the experiences I
could have lived but probably will never live.
(4) Material time and material happenings.
From ancient times humanity has been fascinated by happenings going on in
the sky, the motion of the sun, the changes of the moon, the motions of the
planets and the stars. These happenings in the sky are periodic. By means of
these periodic happenings humans started to coordinate the other experiences.
They introduced the counting of the years, the months and the days. Later on
watches were invented to be able to coordinate experiences of the same day. And
in this sense material time was introduced in the reality of the human species.
Again we want to analyze the way in which this material time was introduced,
to be able to use it operationally if later on we analyze the paradoxes of time
and space.
My present experience is seldom a material time experience. But in replace-
ment of my present experience, I always could have consulted my watch, and
in this way live a material time experience E7(I consult my watch and read the
time). In this way, although my present experience is seldom a material time ex-
perience, my present reality always contains a material time happening, namely
the happening H7(The time indicated by my watch), which is the happening to
which the creation C7(I consult) is fused to form the experience E7.
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We can try to use our theory for a more concrete description of that layer of
reality that we shall refer to as the layer of ’material or energetic happenings’.
We must be aware of the fact that this layer is a huge one, and so first of all
we shall concentrate on those happenings that are related to the interactions
between what we call material (more generally energetic) entities. We have to
analyze first of all in which way the four-dimensional manifold that generally
is referred to as the ’time-space’ of relativity theory, is related to this layer
of material or energetic reality. We shall take into account in this analysis
the knowledge that we have gathered about the reality of quantum entities in
relation with measurements of momentum and position.
10 The structure and construction of reality and
relativity theory.
We consider the set of all material or energetic happenings and denote this set
by M. Happenings of M we shall denote by m,n, o. Let us consider such a
happening m that corresponds to a quantum entity. Then this happening is
characterized by the fact that it is always accessible to a creation of localization
(consisting in localizing the particle in a certain region of space), let us denote
such a creation of localization by l. Then the experience (l,m) is an experience
that can be parametrized by the coordinates of a certain point (x0, x1, x2, x3)
of the four dimensional manifold that is referred to as time-space.
However instead of performing a creation of localization, one can choose to
perform a creation that consists in measuring the momentum of the quantum
entity. Let us denote this creation by i, then the happening (i,m) can be
parametrized by the coordinates of a certain point (p0, p1, p2, p3), that can be
interpreted as the four-momentum of general relativity theory.
We know from quantum theory that the quantum entity can be in different
states, all corresponding to a different statistics as related to repeated localiza-
tions and measurements of momentum. Let us denote these states by q, p, ....
The quantum entity can be in an eigenstate q(x0, x1, x2, x3) of position, which
means that the creation of localization in this eigenstate leads with certainty to
a finding of the quantum entity in the point (x0, x1, x2, x3). The quantum entity
can also be in an eigenstate p(p0, p1, p2, p3) of momentum, which means that by
a measurement of momentum the entity will be found to have the momentum
(p0, p1, p2, p3). But in general the quantum entity will be in a state that is nei-
ther an eigenstate of position nor an eigenstate of momentum. It is only after
the happening p (the state of the quantum entity) has been fused with one of
the creations l (the localization measurement) or i (the momentum measure-
ment) that will be in an eigenstate of localization (a point of time-space) or of
momentum (a point of four-momentum space). This is the general situation for
material happenings.
To show what are the problems that we can solve by means of our framework,
we will concentrate now on the question ’what is reality in relativity theory?’.
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Since we have an operational definition of reality in our framework, we can
investigate this problem in a rigorous way.
Let us suppose that I am here and now in my house in Brussels, and it is
June 1, 1996, 3 pm exactly. I want to find out ’what is the material reality
for me now?’. Let us use the definition of reality given in the foregoing section
and consider a place in New York, for example at the entrance of the Empire
State building, and let us denote, the center of this place by (x1, x2, x3). I
also choose now a certain time, for example June 1, 1996, 3 pm exactly, and
let me denote this time by x0. I denote the happening that corresponds with
the spot (x1, x2, x3) located at the entrance of the Empire State building, at
time x0 by m. I can now try to investigate whether this happening m is part
of my personal material reality. The question I have to answer is, can I find
a creation of localization l, in this case this creation is just the observation of
the spot (x1, x2, x3) at the entrance of the Empire State building, at time x0,
that can be fused with this happening m. The answer to this question can only
be investigated if we take into account the fact that I, who want to try to fuse
a creation of localization to this happening, am bound to my body, which is
also a material entity. I must specify the question introducing the material time
coordinate that I coordinate by my watch. So suppose that I coordinate my
body by the four numbers (y0, y1, y2, y3), where y0 is my material time, and
(y1, y2, y3) is the center of mass of my body. We apply now our operational
definition of reality. A this moment, June 1, 1996 at 3 pm exactly, my body is
in my house in Brussels, which means that (y0, y1, y2, y3) is a point such that
y0 equals June 1, 1996, 3 pm, and (x1, x2, x3) is a point, the center of mass of
my body, somewhere in my house in Brussels. This shows that (x0, x1, x2, x3)
is different from (y0, y1, y2, y3), in the sense that (x1, x2, x3) is different form
(y1, y2, y3) while x0 = y0.
The question is now whether (x0, x1, x2, x3) is a point of my material reality,
hence whether it makes sense to me to claim that now, June 1, 1996, 3 pm,
the entrance of the Empire State building ’exists’. If our theoretical framework
corresponds in some way to our pre-scientific construction of reality, the answer
to the foregoing question should be affirmative. Indeed, we all believe that
’now’ the entrance of the Empire State building exists. Let us try to investigate
in a rigorous way this question in our framework. We have to verify whether
it was possible for me to decide somewhere in my past, hence before June 1,
1996, 3 pm, to change some of my plans of action, such that I would decide to
travel to New York, and arrive exactly at June 1, 1996, 3 pm at the entrance of
the Empire State building, and observe the spot (x1, x2, x3). There are many
ways to realize this experiment, and we will not here go into details, because we
shall come back later to the tricky parts of the realization of this experiment. I
could thus have experienced the spot (x1, x2, x3) at June 1, 1996, 3 pm, if I had
decided to travel to New York at some time in my past. Hence (x0, x1, x2, x3)
is part of my reality. It is sound to claim that the entrance of the Empire State
building exists right now. And we note that this does not mean that I have
to be able to experience this spot at the entrance of the Empire State building
now, June 1, 1996, 3 pm, while I am inside my house of Brussels. I repeat again,
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reality is a construction about the possible happenings that I could have fused
with my actual creation. And since I could have decided so in my past, I could
have been at the entrance of the Empire State building, now, June 1, 1996, 3
pm.
Until this moment one could think that our framework only confirms our
intuitive notion of reality, but our next example shows that this is certainly
not the case. Let us consider the same problem as above, but for another
point of time-space. We consider the point (z0, z1, z2, z3), where (z1, z2, z3) =
(x1, x2, x3), hence the spot we envisage is again the entrance of the Empire State
building, and z0 is June 2, 1996, 3 pm exactly, hence the time that we consider
is, tomorrow 3 pm. If I ask now first, before checking rigorously by means of
our operational definition of reality, whether this point (z0, z1, z2, z3) is part of
my present material reality, the intuitive answer here would be ’no’. Indeed,
tomorrow at the same time, 3 pm, is in the future and not in the present, and
hence it is not real, and hence no part of my present material reality (this is the
intuitive reasoning). If we go now to the formal reasoning in our framework,
then we can see that the answer to this question depends on the interpretation
of relativity theory that we put forward. Indeed, let us first analyze the question
in a Newtonian conception of the world to make things clear. Remark that in
a Newtonian conception of the world (which has been proved experimentally
wrong, so here we are just considering it for the sake of clarity), my present
material reality just falls together with ’the present’, namely all the points of
space that have the same time coordinate June 1, 1996, 3 pm. This means that
the entrance of the Empire State building tomorrow ’is not part of my present
material reality’. The answer is here clear and in this Newtonian conception, my
present personal reality is just the collection of all (u0, u1, u2, u3) where u0 = y0
and (u1, u2, u3) are arbitrary. The world is not Newtonian, this we now know
experimentally; but if we put forward an ether theory interpretation of relativity
theory (let us refer to such an interpretation as a Lorentz interpretation) the
answer again remains the same. In a Lorentz interpretation, my present personal
reality coincides with the present reality of the ether, namely all arbitrary points
of the ether that are at time y0, June 1, 1996 3 pm, and again tomorrow the
entrance of the Empire State building is not part of my present material reality.
For an Einsteinian interpretation of relativity theory the answer is different.
To investigate this I have to ask again the question of whether it would have
been possible for me to have made a decision in my past such that I would have
been able to make coincide (y0, y1, y2, y3) with (z0, z1, z2, z3). The answer here
is that this is very easy to do, because of the well known, and experimentally
verified, effect of ’time dilatation’. Indeed, it would for example be sufficient
that I go back some weeks in my past, let us say April 1, 1996, 3 pm, and
then decide to step inside a space ship that can move with almost the speed
of light, so that the time when I am inside this space ship slows down in such
a way, that when I return with the space ship to planet earth, still flying with
a speed close to the velocity of light, I arrive in New York at the entrance of
the Empire State building with my personal material watch indicating June
1, 1996 3 pm, while the watch that remained at the entrance of the Empire
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State building indicates June 2, 1996 3 pm. Hence in this way I make coincide
(y0, y1, y2, y3) with (z0, z1, z2, z3), which proves that (z0, z1, z2, z3) is part of my
present material reality. First I could remark that in practice it is not yet
possible to make such a flight with a space ship. But this point is not crucial
for our reasoning. It is sufficient that we can do it in principle. We have
not yet made this explicit remark, but obviously if we have introduced in our
framework an operational definition for reality, then we do not have to interpret
such an operational definition in the sense that only operations are allowed that
actually, taking into account the present technical possibilities of humanity, can
be performed. If we were to advocate such a narrow interpretation, then even in
a Newtonian conception of the world, the star Sirius would not exist, because we
cannot yet travel to it. What we mean with operational is much wider. It must
be possible, taking into account the actual physical knowledge of the world, to
conceive of a creation that can be fused with the happening in question, and
then this happening pertains to our personal reality.
(1) Einstein versus Lorentz: has reality four dimensions?
We can come now to one of the points that we want to make in this paper, clar-
ifying the time paradox that distinguishes an ether interpretation of relativity
(Lorentz) from an Einsteinian interpretation. To see clearly in this question, we
must return to the essential aspect of the construction of reality in our frame-
work, namely, the difference between a creation and a happening. We have to
give first another example to be able to make clear what we mean.
Suppose that I am a painter and I consider again my present material reality,
at June 1, 1996, 3 pm, as indicated on my personal material watch. I am in
my house in Brussels and let us further specify: the room where I am is my
workshop, surrounded by paintings, of which some are finished, and others I am
still working on. Clearly all these paintings exist in my presents reality, June 1,
1996, 3 pm. Some weeks ago, when I was still working on a painting that now is
finished, I could certainly have decided to start to work on another painting, a
completely different one, that now does not exist. Even if I could have decided
this some weeks ago, everyone will agree that this other painting, that I never
started to work on, does not exist now, June 1, 1996, 3 pm. The reason for this
conclusion is that the making of a painting is a ’creation’ and not a happening.
It is not so that there is some ’hidden’ space of possible paintings such that my
choice of some weeks ago to realize this other painting would have made me to
detect it. If this were to be the situation with paintings, then indeed also this
painting would exist now, in this hidden space. But with paintings this is not
the case. Paintings that are not realized by the painter are potential paintings,
but they do not exist.
With this example of the paintings we can explain very well the difference
between Lorentz and Einstein. For an ether interpretation of relativity the fact
that my watch is slowing down while I decide to fly with the space ship nearly
at the speed of light and return to the entrance of the Empire State building
when my watch is indicating June 1, 1996, 3 pm while the watch that remained
at the Empire State building indicates June 2, 1996, 3 pm, is interpreted as
40
a ’creation’. It is seen as if there is a real physical effect of creation on the
material functioning of my watch while I travel with the space ship, and this
effect of creation is generated by the movement of the space ship through the
ether. Hence the fact that I can observe the entrance of the Empire State
building tomorrow June 2, 1996 3 pm, if had decided some weeks ago to start
traveling with the space ship, only proves that the entrance of the Empire State
building tomorrow is a potentiality. Just like the fact that this painting that
I never started to paint could have been here in my workshop in Brussels is a
potentiality. This means that as a consequence the spot at the entrance of the
Empire State building tomorrow is not part of my present reality, just as the
possible painting that I did not start to paint is not part of my present reality.
If we however put forward an Einsteinian interpretation of relativity, then the
effect on my watch during the space ship travel is interpreted in a completely
different way. There is no physical effect on the material functioning of the
watch - remember that most of the time dilatation takes place not during the
accelerations that the space ship undergoes during the trip, but during the long
periods of flight with constant velocity nearly at the speed of light - but the
flight at a velocity close to the speed of light ’moves’ my space ship in the time-
space continuum in such a way that time coordinates and space coordinates
get mixed. This means that the effect of the space-ship travel is an effect of
a voyage through the time-space continuum, which brings me at my personal
time of June 1, 1996, 3 pm at the entrance of the Empire State building, where
the time is June 2, 1996, 3 pm. And hence the entrance of the Empire State
building is a happening, an actuality and not just a potentiality, and it can be
fused with my present creation. This means that the happening (z0, z1, z2, z3)
of June 2, 1996, 3 pm, entrance of the Empire State building, is an happening
that can be fused with my creation of observation of the spot around me at June
1, 1996, 3 pm. Hence it is part of my present material reality. The entrance of
the Empire State building at June 2, 1996, 3 pm exists for me today, June 1,
1996 3 pm.
If we advocate an Einsteinian interpretation of relativity theory we have to
conclude from the foregoing section that my personal reality is four dimensional.
This conclusion will perhaps not amaze those who always have considered the
time-space continuum of relativity as representing the new reality. Now that we
have however defined very clearly what this means, we can start investigating
the seemingly paradoxical conclusions that are often brought forward in relation
with this insight.
(2) The process view confronted with the geometric view.
The paradoxical situation that we can now try to resolve is the confrontation
of the process view of reality with the geometric view. It is often claimed
that an interpretation where reality is considered to be related to the four-
dimensional time-space continuum contradicts another view of reality, namely
the one where it is considered to be of a process-like nature. By means of our
framework we can now understand exactly what these two views imply and see
that there is no contradiction. Let us repeat now what in our framework is
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the meaning of the conclusion that my personal reality is four dimensional. It
means that, at a certain specific moment, that I call my ’present’, the collection
of places that exist, and that I could have observed if I had decided to do so in
my past, has a four-dimensional structure, well represented mathematically by
the four dimensional time-space continuum. This is indeed my present material
reality. This does not imply however that this reality is not constantly changing.
Indeed it is constantly changing. New entities are created in it and other entities
disappear, while others are very stable and remain into existence. This in fact
is the case in all of the four dimensions of this reality. Again I have to give an
example to explain what I mean. We came to the conclusion that now, at June
1, 1996, 3 pm the entrance of the Empire State building exists for me while I am
in my house in Brussels. But this is not a statement of derterministic certainty.
Indeed, it is quite possible that by some extraordinary chain of events, and
without me knowing of these events, that the Empire State building had been
destructed; thus my statement about the existence of the entrance of the Empire
State building ’now’, although almost certainly true, is not deterministically
certain. The reason is again the same, namely that reality is a construction
of what I would have been able to experience, if I had decided differently in
my past. The knowledge that I have about this reality is complex and depends
on the changes that go on continuously in it. What I know from experience is
that there do exist material objects, and the Empire State building is one of
them, that are rather stable, which means that they remain in existence without
changing too much. To these stable objects, material objects but also energetic
fields, I can attach the places from where I can observe them. The set of these
places has the structure of a four-dimensional continuum. At the same time
all these objects are continuously changing and moving in this four-dimensional
scenery. Most of the objects that I have used to shape my intuitive model of
reality are the material objects that surround us here on the surface of the earth.
They are all firmly fixed in the fourth dimension (the dimension indicated by
the 0 index, and we should not call it the time dimension) while they move
easily in the other three dimensions (those indicated by the 1, 2, and 3 index).
Other objects, for example the electromagnetic fields, have a completely different
manner of being and changing in this four-dimensional scenery. This means that
in our framework there is no contradiction between the four- dimensionality of
the set of places and the process-like nature of the world. When we come to
the conclusion that the entrance of the Empire State building, tomorrow, June
2, 1996, 3 pm also exists for me now, then our intuition reacts more strongly
to this statement, because intuitively we think that this implies that the future
exists, and hence is determined and hence no change is possible. This is a wrong
conclusion which comes from the fact that during a long period of time we have
had the intuitive image of a Newtonian present, as being completely determined.
We have to be aware of the fact that it is the present, even in the Newtonian
sense, which is not determined at all. We can only say that the more stable
entities in our present reality are more strongly determined to be there, while
the places where they can be are always there, because these places are stable
with certainty.
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(3) The singularity of the reality construction.
We now come back to the construction of reality in our framework which we
have confronted here with the Einsteinian interpretation of relativity theory.
Instead of wondering about the existence of the entrance of the Empire State
building tomorrow, June 2, 1996, 3 pm, I can also question the existence of my
own house at the same place of the time-space continuum. Clearly I can make
an analogous reasoning and come then to the conclusion that my own house, and
the chair where I am sitting while reading the novel, and the novel itself, and
the basket of wall nuts beside me, etc..., all exist in my present reality at June
2, 1996 3 pm, hence tomorrow. If we put it like that, we are even more sharply
confronted with a counter-intuitive aspect of the Einsteinian interpretation of
relativity theory. But in our framework, it is a correct statement . We have to
add however that all these objects that are very close to me now June 1, 1996,
3 pm, indeed also exist in my present reality at June 2, 1996, 3 pm, but the
place in reality where I can observe them is of course much further away for me.
Indeed, to be able to get there, I have to fly away with a space ship at nearly the
velocity of light. We now come to a very peculiar question that will confront
us with the singularity of our reality construction. Where do I myself exist?
Do I also exist tomorrow June 2, 1996, 3 pm? If the answer to this question is
affirmative, we would be confronted with a very paradoxical situation. Because
indeed I, and this counts for all of you also, cannot imagine myself to exist at
different instants of time. But our framework clarifies this question very easily.
It is impossible for me to make some action in my past such that I would be able
to observe myself tomorrow June 2, 1996 3 pm. But if I had chosen to fly away
and come back with the space-ship, it would be quite possible for me to observe
now, on June 1, 1996, at 3 pm on my personal watch, the inside of my house
tomorrow June 2, 1996, 3 pm. As we remarked previously, this proves that the
inside of my house tomorrow is part of my personal reality today. But I will
not find myself in it. Because to be able to observe my house tomorrow June 2,
1996 3 pm, I have had to leave it. Hence, in this situation I will enter my house,
being myself still at June 1, 1996, 3 pm, but with my house and all the things
in it, being at June 2, 1996, 3 pm. This shows that there is no contradiction.
11 What about the nature of reality?
Let us finally investigate what is the meaning of all this for the nature of real-
ity. As we remarked already in our formal analysis of the construction of our
personal reality, our most primitive intuition about the nature of reality is that
of a situation where there is ’the past’, ’the present’ and ’the future’. ’Reality’
is what ’exists’ in ’the present’ and is constantly changing, and new things are
coming into existence. ’The past’ is a collection of what has been real, but does
not exist anymore, while ’the future’ is the field where the potentialities for pos-
sible realities are imagined by us. Let us refer to this intuitive hypothesis about
the nature of reality as the ’past-present-future hypothesis’. Further we think
that reality consists of ’entities’ and ’interactions between these entities, which
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exist at each instant of time and which change and evolve in time. Among these
entities there are the material (or energetic) entities: these we imagine them to
be present in space at any moment of time, as a kind of ’substance’. We shall
refer to this hypothesis as to the ’space contains reality hypothesis’. This is an
important part of the intuitive view about the state of affairs around us. Within
this intuitive view there are many subtle questions that have occupied scientists
and philosophers during the history of mankind. One of the fundamental ques-
tions is that of the role of the observer in relation to this intuitive view on
reality. We know that all that we know about reality has come to us from our
personal experience with this reality. It is also clear that while we experience we
also at the same time exert an influence, and sometimes we also create. Within
the intuitive view we also imagine reality to be independent of our experiencing
it. To put it more directly, reality would also exist if humankind would not be
there, and if I would not be here now to experience it. Let us call this belief
the ’realist hypothesis’. Newtonian mechanics and its elaborations had delivered
at the beginning of the foregoing century a complete theory of the inanimate
world, wherein the role of the observer literally could be neglected. The world
presented itself as being a huge mechanic clockwork, evolving deterministically
according to the equations of Newton. We, the observers, did not have to be
taken into account, because the act of observation could be eliminated com-
pletely and hence did not have to be described in the theory. This picture was
also - independently of its realist aspects - in agreement with the intuitive view:
it was a fine and detailed mathematical modeling of this view and we shall refer
to it as ’the classical mechanical view’. The ’past-present-future hypothesis’ and
the ’space contains reality hypothesis’ are satisfied in this ’classical mechanical
view’. Indeed, reality is considered to be a collection of material objects or sub-
stances, present at any moment of time at some place in a three dimensional
Euclidean space, and interacting with each other within this space, by means of
interaction fields.
Within this Newtonian development many additional and fundamental as-
pects were added to the intuitive view. For instance, classical mechanics is a
deterministic theory: the state of the world at a certain moment, be it past,
present or future, is linked in a deterministic way to the state of the world at
any earlier moment. Let us call this ’the determinist hypothesis’ and remark
that no strict belief about determinism was originally incorporated in the intu-
itive view. The ’classical mechanical view’ came into deep problems when Max
Planck made the first moves towards quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics
showed that the effect of the measurement had to be taken into account in a
crucial and non-reducible way for the description of the micro-world; apparently,
the old classical determinism was gone for good.
(1) Within the creation-discovery view and quantum mechanics, there are
no reasons why the ’past-present-future hypothesis’ should run into problems.
Indeed, we can still consider reality as a process that is ever changing and where
the past is just the recollection of how this reality has been, and the future the
imagining of possible ways that this reality can become.
(2) There is also no problem with the deterministic hypothesis. There is no
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incompatibility at all between quantum mechanics and a complete deterministic
world as a whole, since the probabilities appearing in the quantum theory can
be explained as being due to a lack of knowledge about the interaction between
the measuring apparatus and the entity during the measurement, and hence are
of epistemic nature.
(3) The ’space contains reality hypothesis’, as we have explained in much de-
tail, is the one that in our opnion has to be abandoned. Reality is not contained
within space. Space is a momentaneous cristalization of a theatre for reality
where the motions and interactions of the macroscopical material and energetic
entities take place. But other entities - like quantum entities for example - ’take
place’ outside space, or - and this would be another way of saying the same
thing - within a space that is not the three dimensional Euclidean space.
(4) Quantum mechanics is not in contradiction with the ’realist hypothesis’.
It is possible to believe that reality exists independently of our observing and
measuring it, and also that it would be there if there were no humans to observe
and influence it. But, as we have said already, this reality is is not contained
within Euclidian space.
(5) When we consider relativity theory the situation is very subtle. For
an ether interpretation of relativity theory, there is no problem at all, since
my personal reality remains identical with the three dimensional space that is
shared by all other humans, and hence can be considered as ’the present’. If an
Einsteinian interpretation of relativity theory is advocated, my personal reality
has four dimensions, and the personal realities of my fellow humans on earth
also all have four dimensions. The present-past-future hypothesis remains valid
for all these personal realities, but it is not possible to fit them together into a
single present-past-future scheme. This shows that such a scheme is not without
problems if we want to give a description of the structure of reality that is not
just the union of all the personal realities. We are at present working hard to
try and understand in which way these personal realities - all four-dimensional
and all changing within a personal past-present-future scheme - can be fitted
together inside a structure that would account for a ’reality’ which would be
independent of all these personal realities.
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